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DOES SMALL GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE DELIVER
GROUP BENEFITS? AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF
ALLOWING THE SMALL GROUP MARKET TO DIE
John Aloysius Cogan Jr.*
Abstract: The small group health insurance market is failing. Today, fewer than one-third
of small firms now offer health insurance and the number of people covered by small group
insurance continues to drop. These problems invite the obvious question: What should be
done about the small group market? Past scholarship on the small group market has largely
focused on documenting the market’s problems, evaluating the effectiveness of prior reform
efforts, and proposing regulatory changes to stabilize the market. This Article takes a
different approach to the small group problem by asking a previously unasked question: Does
the small group market deliver group insurance benefits? Group insurance, first established
in the life insurance industry, came about because it offered insureds a better deal than
individual coverage. Group insurance provided four core benefits: reduced adverse selection,
lower administrative costs, greater access to insurance, and tax-subsidized premiums. This
Article argues the small group market largely fails to deliver the core benefits of group
coverage. For many, the small group market offers no better deal than the individual market.
Given these findings, it is hard to justify further interventions to save the small group market.
The decline and dissolution of the small group market would likely shift millions to the
individual market, resulting in a substantially larger and more stable individual market.
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INTRODUCTION
The small group health insurance market,1 covering employers with
fifty or fewer employees,2 is failing. Despite repeated legislative efforts
to reform the small group market stretching back nearly three decades,
including substantial changes under the Affordable Care Act (ACA),3
the steady decline of the small group market continues. Only 29% of
small employers now offer health insurance coverage to their
employees,4 down from 51% in the mid-1990s.5 Small group enrollment

1. The large and small group health insurance markets offer fully insured coverage. This means
the employer purchases a health insurance policy to cover its employees from a state-licensed
insurer. In exchange for a premium payment by the employer, the insurer bears the full risk for all
claims covered by the policy. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or
“One Good Loophole Deserves Another”, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 89, 89–90
(2005). In contrast, self-insured (also called self-funded) employer groups do not purchase health
insurance. Instead, they bear the risk, at least partially, of the health care expenses of their
employees through an insurance-like employee benefit plan. Id.
2. Prior to the ACA, the large employer group market consisted of employers with fifty-one or
more employees, and the small employer group market consisted of employers with fifty or fewer
employees. The ACA amended these definitions to enlarge the small employer group market to
include employers with up to 100 employees as of January 1, 2016. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1304(a)(3)(b)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). Congress later amended the ACA to retain the
original definitions of large and small group employers. Protecting Affordable Coverage for
Employees Act, Pub. L. 114-60, § 2(a)(1)–(2), 129 Stat. 543 (2015) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). Four states—California, Colorado, New York, and Vermont—currently extend their
small group market to cover employers with up to 100 employees. Sabrina Corlette et al., Repeal of
Small-Business Provision of the ACA Creates Natural Experiment in States, COMMONWEALTH
FUND (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/mar/repeal-ofsmall-business-provision-of-the-aca [https://perma.cc/DE2G-5GVC].
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
4. 2016 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component National-Level Summary
Tables, Table I.A.2 Percent of Private-sector Establishments that Offer Health Insurance by Firm
Size and Selected Characteristics: United States (2016), AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH &
QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2016), https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_
tables/insr/national/series_1/2016/tia2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR7V-8GRR] (reporting that only
28.6% of private-sector firms with less than fifty employees offered health insurance coverage).
5. See Michael A. Morrisey et al., Small Employers and the Health Insurance Market, HEALTH
AFF., Jan. 1994, at 149, 150 (noting that 51% of small businesses offered health insurance in 1993).
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has also declined significantly, dropping to 14.7 million people in
20156—a loss of nearly 3.5 million since 2012.7
The small group market’s history of poor performance has stimulated
considerable scholarship, much of it focused on evaluating reform
efforts and proposing regulatory changes to stabilize the market.8
Scholarship and policy analysis following passage of the ACA has
largely travelled down the same path, with some arguing that the small
group market should be protected from further decline.9 This Article
takes a different approach to the small group market. It poses a central
but previously unexplored question: Does the small group market deliver
group insurance benefits? Group insurance came about for a single
reason: it offered insureds a better deal than individual coverage. If small

6. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS ET AL., MILLIMAN, 2015 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL RESULTS 6 fig.4 (2017) [hereinafter MILLIMAN 2015],
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2017/2015-commercial-health-insurance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5WL-JBDF].
7. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS, MILLIMAN, 2012 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE: OVERVIEW OF
FINANCIAL
RESULTS
1
fig.1
(2013)
[hereinafter
MILLIMAN
2012],
http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/healthreform/
2012-commerical-health-insurance-financial-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAC9-3XH7] (reporting
18.1 million covered lives in the small group market in 2012).
8. See, e.g., Rick Curtis et al., Health Insurance Reform in the Small-Group Market, HEALTH
AFF. May-June 1999, at 151 (examining the scope and development of small group health insurance
rating laws in the 1990s); Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance
Reform Laws, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 685 (1999) (evaluating how small group health insurance
reform laws affected competition among insurers); Catherine G. McLaughlin & Wendy K. Zellers,
The Shortcomings of Voluntarism in the Small-Group Insurance Market, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1992, at 28 (assessing results of health care financing projects for small businesses); Alan C.
Monheit & Barbara Steinberg Schone, How Has Small Group Market Reform Affected Employee
Health Insurance Coverage?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 237 (2003) (evaluating effects of small group
reforms in the 1990s); Olympia J. Snowe, Small Business Health Plans: A Critical Step in Solving
the Small Business Health Care Crisis, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 231 (2006) (arguing in favor of
proposed legislation that would allow small businesses to offer association-sponsored health
insurance).
9. See e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers Under
the Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 539
(2013) (analyzing the problems self-insurance poses to the small-group market and proposing
legislative solutions); Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935 (2013) (proposing solutions to “save” the small group market
from instability after the ACA takes effect); Matthew Buettgens & Linda J. Blumberg, Small Firm
Self-Insurance Under the Affordable Care Act, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2 (Nov. 28, 2012),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_iss
ue_brief_2012_nov_1647_buettgens_small_firm_self_insurance_under_aca_ib.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4FC-FX67] (arguing that regulation of stop-loss insurance will reduce adverse
selection in the small group market). But see Allison K. Hoffman, An Optimist’s Take on the
Decline of Small-Employer Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 113 (2013) (arguing that the
U.S. health insurance system might be better off without the small group market after the ACA).
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group health insurance does not deliver insureds a better deal than
coverage available in the individual health insurance market, there is
little reason to save the small group market from further decline and
dissolution.10
In order to proceed with this inquiry, it is important to first understand
what “a better deal than individual coverage” means in relation to the
small group market. To do so, the benefits of group insurance that make
it more desirable than individual insurance must be identified. Although
modern scholars have laid out an extensive catalog of the benefits of
group health insurance, no consensus exists as to the core benefits that
make group health insurance a better deal than individual coverage.11 To
identify the core benefits of group coverage, this Article turns to the
birthplace of group insurance—the life insurance industry just after the
turn of the last century. When first offered about a century ago, the
group insurance model revolutionized life insurance by providing three
benefits: (1) a reduced risk of adverse selection, (2) lower administrative
expenses, and (3) expanded access to coverage. A fourth benefit, a
federal tax advantage, also lowered the cost of group coverage.
Together, these four core benefits made group insurance a better deal
10. Throughout this Article, I refer to the dissolution or death of the small group market. This can
mean one of two future states of the market. The first is a death spiral, a circular pattern in which
low-risk insureds leave the market, thereby driving up prices, which prompts more low-risk to
leave, driving up prices even more. This cycle continues until the risk pool collapses and no one
remains covered. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224 (2004) (explaining how adverse selection can lead to a death
spiral). A second possibility is that the small group market continues to decline but eventually
stabilizes, albeit with low enrollment and high costs. This would leave the small group market
functioning, but dwarfed by the individual and large group markets.
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, HEALTH INSURANCE 244–46 (2d ed. 2014) (identifying
benefits of group coverage: healthier risk pool, tax subsidies, lower administrative costs, and
employers as beneficial agents for employees); Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of EmploymentBased Health Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885,
893–902 (2011) (discussing how employer-based group coverage provides favorable tax treatment,
lower costs, beneficial agency relationships between the employer and its employees, and labor
incentives); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 30–35 (2001) (finding that group insurance offers
employers as beneficial agents, solutions to bounded rationality problems, valuable administrative
services, efficiencies of scale with regard to costs, a tax subsidy that binds a heterogeneous risk
pool, and reduced adverse selection, among others); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Employer-Based Health
Insurance: A Balance Sheet, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 124, 125–26 (discussing how
employer-based group coverage effectively pools health insurance risks, provides a tax benefit,
offers opportunity for innovation in the purchase of health care, and reflects consumer preferences).
Group health coverage has also been subject to criticism. See, e.g., Hyman & Hall, supra, at 27–30
(discussing “informational, preference, and incentive mismatches—between employers and
employees, and between employee groups and individual employees—that play out in the cost and
breadth of [group] coverage”).
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than individual insurance by lowering the cost of life insurance and
making it available to those who would have been denied coverage in
the individual market.12
Using these four benefits as a framework to evaluate small group
health insurance, this Article draws two conclusions about the small
group market. First, small employers have always been an awkward fit
in the group insurance market. Due to their size and the actuarial limits
of experience rating, small groups cannot be priced or administered the
same way as large groups. As a result, the small group market has
always been (and continues to be) exposed to adverse selection, very
much like the individual insurance market.13
Second, the post-ACA small group market largely fails to deliver
group benefits to its insureds, in part because of its adverse selection
problems and in part because the ACA brought a number of
improvements to the individual market. While the small group market
was thought to provide worthwhile benefits over the individual market
prior to the ACA (i.e., greater access to coverage, a tax subsidy not
available to purchasers in the individual market, and lower
administrative costs),14 the post-ACA small group market: (1) provides
no greater protection from adverse selection than the individual market,
(2) fails to deliver insurance at a lower administrative cost than the
individual market, and (3) does not offer any greater access to coverage
than the individual market. As for the fourth benefit, the tax subsidy, the
results are mixed. Insureds in the small group market with higher
incomes enjoy a tax subsidy that is not available to them in the
individual market. Conversely, lower- and middle-income individuals
get a better tax subsidy in the individual market.15
As a result of these findings, there appears to be little reason to prop
up the small group market. Allowing the small group market to continue
its decline would likely push millions to the individual market.16 This
12. See infra sections I.A–B.
13. See infra section II.B.
14. See, e.g., Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1944 (noting that prior to the ACA, “the
individual market for health insurance . . . has historically been even less attractive than the smallgroup market” due to the lack of a tax benefit and significant adverse selection).
15. See infra Part III.
16. Although the individual market is the natural landing spot for many leaving the small group
market, it is unlikely that everyone shifting out of that market will transition to the individual
market. Some small employers currently in the small group market will self-insure as the small
group market declines. Member of some households will shift to a large group plan through a
spouse or other family member. Other may avail themselves of other types of coverage, such as
short-term coverage. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. Some will remain uninsured.
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would help reduce the fragmentation that has long beset our private
health insurance markets. It would also make the individual health
insurance market larger and more stable. Of course, not everyone would
win if the small group market were allowed to die off. The biggest losers
would be the high earners in the small group market who will lose their
premium tax subsidy. But it makes little sense to maintain an entire
insurance market to retain a tax benefit for only some insureds.17 If
Congress wanted to maintain this tax break after the collapse of the
small group market, it could, for example, allow small employers to
reimburse their high-income employees for premiums paid in the
individual market with pre-tax wages. Indeed, prior to the ACA, small
employers could reimburse their employees with pre-tax dollars for
premiums they paid for individual market coverage and can still do so to
a limited extent.18
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the origins of
group coverage in the life insurance market, explains the advantages of
group coverage over individual insurance, and sets out the framework
that is used in Part III to evaluate the benefits of the small group market.
Part I also describes three aspects of the group insurance model that have
negatively affected the functionality of the small group market:
experience rating, group size limits, and market competition. Next,
Part II shifts to the development of group health insurance, its expansion
into small group coverage, and the detrimental effect of experience
rating and market competition on the small group market. Part III, the
heart of this Article, applies the core benefits identified in Part I to the
post-ACA small group market. Drawing on the analysis in Part II and
recent data, this Article demonstrates that the post-ACA small group
market offers no advantages over the individual market with respect to
adverse selection, access to coverage, or administrative costs. For those
with low or moderate incomes, below 400% of the federal poverty level
(FPL), the individual market offers a better tax subsidy. For those above
400% FPL, the small group market offers a better subsidy. Finally,
Part IV considers some additional questions about the small group
market. Does small group coverage provide consumer or employer

17. To be sure, the tax inequities of our health insurance system are longstanding and they have
long favored the wealthy. See STAN DORN, URBAN INST., CAPPING THE TAX EXCLUSION OF
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH
INSURANCE: IS EQUITY
FEASIBLE?
1
(2009),
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411894_cappingthetaxexclusion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LL9BZHMR] (noting that the group insurance tax exclusion provides the most benefit “to the affluent,
who pay the highest marginal tax rates and who tend to receive the most generous health benefits”).
18. See infra notes 302–303, and accompanying text.
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benefits that weigh in favor of preserving the market? Fixes have been
suggested for the small group market. If these fixes are implemented,
will the small group market deliver group benefits? Finally, who will be
the winners and losers if the small group market dies?
I.

LIFE INSURANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF GROUP
COVERAGE

This Part describes the development of group insurance as it first
emerged in the life insurance industry, thereby laying the foundation for
the analysis of the small group health insurance market in Part III.
Section I.A describes the individual insurance market just prior to the
advent of group life insurance. Adverse selection and high
administrative costs were core problems in the individual life insurance
market. These problems paved the way for group coverage. Next,
section I.B describes the advent of group insurance and identifies the
four core benefits that made group insurance an attractive alternative to
individual insurance. Section I.C closes by explaining the legacy of three
aspects of the group model for small group coverage: experience rating,
group size, and competition.
A.

Individual Life Insurance, Adverse Selection, and High
Administrative Costs

Individual life insurance had been available for more than one
hundred years before the group insurance model emerged.19 Although
largely scorned by the public for decades,20 life insurance had developed
into a desirable commodity by the mid-1800s.21 No longer viewed as
gambling for “dirty money” or the immoral pricing of human life,22 life
19. See Viviana A. Zelizer, Human Values and the Market: The Case of Life Insurance and Death
in 19th-Century America, 84 AM. J. SOC. 591, 595 (1978) (noting that life insurance was first sold
in the U.S. in the late eighteenth century).
20. See VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017) [hereinafter ZELIZER, MORALS] (noting that early on,
life insurance had been considered “‘detrimental’ to the interests of the country”).
21. Shifts in economic conditions and cultural values in the nineteenth century made life
insurance a desirable commodity. Urbanization in the nineteenth century coupled with family
reliance on wage income created financial insecurity for widows and orphans. Id. at 12–13. In the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, inherited land often provided widows and orphans
sufficient resources for support. Id. at 62. Urbanization changed this, making families almost
exclusively dependent on the husband/father’s wage. With little capital beyond his income and no
property to pass on to the family, the premature death of an urban breadwinner “spelled economic
disaster to his widow and orphans.” Id. at 66.
22. By the mid-1800s, the growing awareness of the connection between death and economic loss
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insurance was regarded as a responsible way for urban breadwinners to
provide for their families after death.23 To some, the purchase of life
insurance was even viewed as a moral obligation.24
But life insurance was not available to everyone. Individual coverage
was expensive and exclusive; many applicants could not meet the price25
or the stringent application and medical examination requirements26 and
were excluded from coverage. These barriers were largely the result of
two factors: insurer fears of adverse selection and the high costs of
marketing and administering individual insurance policies. In turn, these
barriers imposed financial and social costs on families unable to access
coverage.
1.

Barriers to Individual Coverage

a.

Adverse Selection

Adverse selection is an information problem; it occurs when buyers of
insurance know more about their own risk of making a claim than the
insurance company.27 If buyers use their own private risk information
when purchasing or forgoing insurance, an insurer can lose money. 28 A
simple example illustrates how adverse selection works. Imagine two
made the public more receptive to insurers’ discourse linking life insurance to a “good death.” Id. at
50, 60–64. Life insurance was seen as a form of risk management and a moral means to economic
security of the family. Id. at 66. See also SOLOMON S. HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 12 (1921)
(“Failure of the head of a family to insure his life . . . amounts to gambling with the greatest of all
chances, and the gamble is a particularly mean one since . . . the dependent family and not the
gambler must suffer the consequences.”).
23. See ZELIZER, MORALS, supra note 20, at 66.
24. BURTON JESSE HENDRICK, THE STORY OF LIFE INSURANCE 262 (1907) (“He who has
dependents and no income except the product of his own toil is as morally bound to carry life
insurance as he is to furnish his children food and shelter.”).
25. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 250, WELFARE WORK
FOR EMPLOYEES IN INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1919) (noting that
individual life insurance was too expensive for most workers); P. H. McCormack, Group Insurance,
51 J. INST. ACTUARIES 313, 314 (1919) (“Ordinary life insurance . . . is of course beyond the means
of the majority of wage-earners . . . .”).
26. See Henry C. Lippincott, The Essentials of Life Insurance Administration, 26 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 192, 200 (1905) (“In dealing with life insurance men act selfishly . . . if the
medical examiner did not stand at the entrance gate, the weakest and least desirable lives would be
surest and soonest to come in.”); John M. Holcombe, Life Insurance in the United States, 150 N.
AM. REV. 401, 402 (1890) (“[I]t has been found necessary . . . to admit only those who shall be
found by physical examination and personal and family record to possess in the highest degree the
elements of longevity.”).
27. See Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1223.
28. See id. at 1224.
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types of people, a sick person who is likely to die soon and a healthy
person who is unlikely to die soon. Both are considering buying life
insurance. The insurer, however, is handicapped by an information
disadvantage: it does not know the health status of its applicants. If the
insurer sets its premiums based on the population’s average risk of
death, the sick person, with a high risk of death, will find the coverage to
be a good deal and will buy the insurance. On the other hand, the healthy
person, with a low risk of death, will find the same policy too expensive
and will not buy the insurance. If this scenario plays out on a larger
scale—too many sick people buy insurance and too many healthy people
forgo it—the insurer’s claims costs will be higher than expected. The
premium collected will not cover claims costs and the insurer will lose
money.29
Fear of adverse selection drove life insurers to collect and evaluate
personal information about their applicants. They used a process called
underwriting to screen out high-risk applicants.30 Only those who passed
a selective application process and medical examination were offered
coverage.31 In addition to screening out high-risk applicants, insurers
also used sales agents to aggressively bring low-risk applicants into the
insurance pool.32 As Burton J. Hendrick noted in 1907 in The Story of
Life Insurance, there is “a powerful actuarial justification” for hiring
agents:
Experience has demonstrated that men do not insure of their
own free will. They must be clubbed into it . . . . Properly
regulated, [the agent system] brings only healthy lives into the
company. A man anticipating early death does not need to be
persuaded; he is only too glad to obtain a policy. That is the
class which voluntarily seeks insurance.33

29. See id. at 1223–24.
30. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y
& L. 287, 295 (1993); id. at 294–95 (noting that life insurers developed underwriting as a process
“to find ‘the best and most desirable insureds’”); see also EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M.
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 133 (11th ed. 2014) (noting that
underwriting “is an essential element in the operation of any insurance program” and that unless the
insurer “selects from among its applicants” adverse selection will be “inevitable”).
31. See Holcombe, supra note 26, at 402.
32. See ZELIZER, MORALS, supra note 20, at 136–43 (describing the indispensability of direct
person-to-person sales by agents of the life insurance industry); id. at 137 (noting that by 1905 the
leading life insurance companies each employed 10,000 to 15,000 agents and subagents).
33. See HENDRICK, supra note 24, at 262–63.
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Administrative Costs

Efforts to reduce adverse selection, however, came at considerable
expense. The costs of individual underwriting (screening every applicant
and engaging physicians to conduct medical examinations) and paying
thousands of agents to sell individual coverage were significant. When
added to the costs of managing thousands of individual life insurance
policies, an insurer’s administrative costs could consume a sizable
percentage of the premium, in some cases as high as 80% of the first
year’s premium.34
2.

The Social and Financial Costs of Underwriting

Certainly, underwriting benefitted the insurance companies and the
applicants who bought insurance. Insurers covered a less risky and more
predictable pool of insureds. This reduced insurers’ financial risk,
allowing them to charge lower premiums, and made them more
competitive. For insurer and insured, this was a win-win situation. But
there was also a tradeoff. Those denied coverage lacked the financial
protection of insurance. As Tom Baker has argued, such denials imposed
social and financial consequences. Insurance not only preserves social
status through risk sharing but also assigns status when limiting access
through underwriting:
[T]he children of a parent refused life . . . insurance maintain[ed]
a more tenuous grasp on their [social] position as a result of the
insurers having classified their parent as a high risk. Should the
parent die . . . there [would] be no insurance payment to offset
the loss of the parent’s income.35
Group insurance provided at least a partial solution to this tradeoff.
The group insurance model not only lowered costs and reduced adverse
selection, it also increased access to the financial protections of life
insurance.
B.

Group Life Insurance

The first group life insurance policy, sold in 1911 by the Equitable
Life Assurance Society of New York (Equitable), covered 121
34. See HUEBNER, supra note 22, at 209–12 (describing the administrative charges of individual
life insurance); id. at 210 (noting that one actuary’s review of life insurance company records found
that administrative expenses took up 80% of the first year’s premium).
35. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification,
9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003).
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employees of the Pantasote Leather Co.36 In the months following the
Pantasote contract, Equitable issued several more group polices,
including a large policy providing nearly $6 million in coverage for
nearly three thousand employees of the retailer Montgomery Ward and
Co.37 Other insurers quickly recognized group life insurance as “a
tremendous business opportunity”38 and energetically entered the group
insurance market.39 By the end of 1930—less than two decades after the
Pantasote policy was issued—life insurers provided nearly $10 billion of
group life insurance on 6.5 million employees.40 Today, employer-based
group life insurance covers nearly three quarters of full-time employees
in the United States.41
Group insurance made its mark with a simple change to insurance
practice: it shifted the focus of underwriting from the individual to the
group.42 This change produced three advantages over individual
insurance: (1) reduced risk of adverse selection, (2) lowered
administrative expenses, and (3) greater access to coverage.43
Additionally, federal tax laws produced a fourth benefit: employer
expenditures for group life insurance were deductible expenses for the
employer and were not considered taxable income of employees.
1.

Reduced Risk of Adverse Selection

Group insurance minimized the risk of adverse selection two ways.
First, the risk pool—the group of insured individuals—was formed
independent of a demand for insurance. In the individual life insurance

36. See Michael Bucci, Growth of Employer-Sponsored Group Life Insurance, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Oct. 1991, at 25, 25.
37. Montgomery Ward approached Equitable as early as 1910 seeking a group policy, the policy
was not issued until 1912. See C. Manton Eddy, Development and Significance of Group Life
Insurance, in GROUP INSURANCE HANDBOOK 45, 46 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds.,
1965). The policy was issued along with a disability income contract, issued by the London
Guarantee and Accident Company. See A Large Life and Casualty Line, 38 INDICATOR 149, 149
(1912).
38. See Bucci, supra note 36, at 27.
39. See id.
40. William J. Graham, Group Insurance, 161 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 40, 41 (1932).
41. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2017, Bull. No. 2787, tbl.16 (2017),
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ebbl0061.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU92-GPXR] (noting
73% of full-time civilian workers participate in employer-sponsored life insurance).
42. See McCormack, supra note 25, at 314–15 (“The distinctive feature of group insurance is that
the unit of insurance is not the single life but a group of lives.”).
43. See supra section I.B.
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market, applicants joined the risk pool precisely because they wanted to
buy insurance. This raised the risk (and insurer fears) of adverse
selection. Conversely, in employer-based group coverage, only
employees entered the risk pool. Since employees came to the group for
a reason other than to buy insurance (i.e., to get a job), the group was
unlikely to be disproportionality populated with high-risk individuals
seeking insurance.44 While the group model reduced the risk of adverse
selection, it did not eliminate it; there was still a risk of adverse selection
from within the group of potential insureds. The group likely included
some high-risk individuals. If only those high-risk employees sought
insurance through the group, adverse selection would be a problem.
Insurers controlled this adverse selection risk by imposing a minimum
participation requirement. This meant that a minimum percentage of the
group of employees had to participate in the life insurance plan.45
Together, the employer-based group model and the minimum
participation requirement substantially reduced the possibility of adverse
selection compared to individual coverage. This eliminated the need for
individual underwriting in group coverage.
2.

Lower Administrative Costs

The second benefit of group insurance was lower administrative costs.
Group coverage reduced the per-life cost of coverage compared to
individual insurance. Marketing costs were reduced because sales efforts
were directed toward a small number of large employers rather than
thousands and thousands of individuals. Because rates were determined
on a group basis, the costs of individual underwriting were eliminated.46
A single contract was issued to the group, reducing the insurer’s clerical
44. See DUNCAN M. MACINTYRE, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE AND RATE MAKING 4 (1962)
(noting that adverse selection is reduced because employer groups are organized for a reason other
than obtaining insurance); Note, Some Economic and Legal Aspects of Group Insurance Policies, 36
COLUM. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1936) (“The danger that sub-standard risks will band together for the
sole purpose of insurance can be avoided only by a limitation to groups organized for a bona fide
purpose.”).
45. An insurance industry standard was first proposed in 1917. The standard required 100%
participation of employees if the employer paid the entire premium and a minimum participation of
75% if employees contributed to coverage. By 1917 a committee of the National Convention of
Insurance Commissioners in collaboration with a committee of actuaries representing the insurance
companies recommended a minimum participation rate of 75% of employees. See Sterling Pierson,
The Legislatures Expand the Group Insurance Field, 15 A.B.A. J. 407, 409 (1929) (quoting
PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONVENTION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 27–29 (1918)).
46. Frank W. Hanft, Group Life Insurance: Its Legal Aspects, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 90
(1935) (“[T]he cheapness of group insurance is supposed to spring from economies produced by the
nature of the device, such as the elimination of medical examinations . . . .”).
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expenses. In addition, many administrative costs were shifted to the
employer, including record keeping and premium collection.47 This
meant that coverage could be written in the employment-based market at
a considerably lower cost than would be the case if each member of the
pool were individually insured. These savings could be passed on in the
form of lower premiums.
3.

Increased Access to Coverage

Group coverage made life insurance more accessible by eliminating
the restrictive underwriting practices of individual insurance, which in
turn expanded insurance benefits to most members of society, including
many previously thought to be uninsurable.48 This access, however,
required membership in a group, typically a group of employees. Thus,
while group coverage increased access to life insurance, it did so only
for those who could work. Group coverage opened no new doors for
those unable to work (e.g., the elderly or the very sick) or those who
could not find work.
4.

The Tax Advantage of Group Insurance

Favorable treatment under federal tax laws was a major advantage of
group insurance. Employers could deduct group life insurance premiums
as ordinary and necessary business expenses when calculating their
taxable income.49 Moreover, premiums paid by employers for group life
insurance were not considered taxable employee income.50
C.

The Legacy of the Group Insurance Model

The group insurance model was generally well-received51 and, as
described in Part II, later became the dominant method for delivering
47. See EARL T. CRAWFORD & SAMUEL P. HARLAN, THE LAW OF GROUP INSURANCE 4–5 (1936);
Davis W. Gregg, Fundamental Characteristics of the Group Technique, in GROUP INSURANCE
HANDBOOK 31, 41–42 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965).
48. See Gregg, supra note 47, at 43; McCormack, supra note 25, at 314 (noting that one of the
objects of group insurance was to enable “many grades of wage-earners, who could not otherwise
be adequately insured, to obtain the benefit of substantial life insurance protection, at least during
the period of their employment”).
49. O. 1014, 1920-2 C.B. 88, 89–90 (1920).
50. Id. In 1964 the law changed, limiting employees to $50,000 in tax-exempt employer-provided
life insurance coverage. See William W. Keefer, Forms of Group Permanent Life Insurance, in
GROUP INSURANCE HANDBOOK 128, 134–35 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965).
51. Although the group insurance model spread rapidly, it did draw early criticism. Detractors
complained that group insurance was paternalistic. See CRAWFORD & HARLAN, supra note 47, at 6.
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health insurance in the United States. But there are two features of group
insurance, experience rating and group size, as well as a third issue
related to insurer competition in the presence of adverse selection, that
are worth additional discussion. These features played a role in shaping
the group insurance market and contributed to problems when group
coverage was extended to small firms.
1.

Experience Rating

Experience rating is the principal method for calculating premiums
under the group model. Under experience rating, each group pays a
premium based on its own claims costs.52 Initially, the group insurance
model did not rely on experience rating; group life policies were priced
using standard actuarial tables.53 By the 1920s, life insurers had
embraced experience rating for their group business.54
To the insurance industry, experience rating was the hallmark of
insurance equity and fairness—each group pays for its own risk.55 But
the “experience-rating-as-fairness” narrative does not fully square with
the historical origins of experience rating. First used the 1890s,56
experience rates (then called “special rates”) were developed by
employers’ liability insurers as a means to compete in a market
dominated by intense price competition.57 But in the liability insurance

Some complained that coverage was gratuitous gift, like a bonus or a holiday turkey, meant to bribe
workers or prevent them from leaving. They also noted the possibility of impaired job mobility if
the insurance coverage was particularly valuable to the employee or his family, and that coverage
was linked to the interests and finances of the employer. Note, supra note 44, at 91–92.
52. See J.F. Follmann, Jr., Experience Rating vs. Community Rating, 29 J. INS. 403, 403 (1962)
(“Experience rating is based on the traditional insurance concept of basing a premium for a group of
individuals on the probability of loss among that group.”).
53. Group life policies initially priced groups using standard actuarial tables, much like individual
life insurance. See Insurance Commissioners’ National Convention, 81 STANDARD 213, 219 (1917)
(noting discussion by actuary H. Pierson Hammond discussing group life rates and noting that rates
were initially based on standard life expectancy rates but shifted to the experience of the insured
groups).
54. While it is not clear exactly when life insurers adopted experience rating, it may have
appeared as early as 1919. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 45–46 (noting that experience rating
may have begun as early as 1919, but was authorized by statute in New York by 1926).
55. See id. at 28.
56. See id. at 39 (noting that “special rates” in employers’ liability insurance date back to 1896 or
earlier).
57. See id. at 37. At the time, price completion was a significant problem in the insurance
industry. Employer liability rates were based on classification—high for firms in risky industries,
low for firms in safer industries. As the market for employers’ liability insurance grew, more
insurers entered the market. Intense competition drove rates too low, resulting in insurer losses. In
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setting, experience rating was also thought to have salutary effects as
means to encourage loss prevention. An employer with a safe
workplace—and fewer than average liability claims—would be
rewarded with lower premiums. Thus, experience rating also became a
means of loss prevention.58 The prospect of lower premiums provided an
incentive to reduce liability risks.
In life and health insurance markets, however, loss prevention had
only limited relevance.59 Life and health claims costs were (and continue
to be) largely tied to the identities of the employees. Employer groups
with older and sicker workers will produce more claims than employer
groups with younger and healthier workers, thereby raising premiums.60
Competition was the main driver behind the use of experience rating in
these markets61 and the identities of the employer group (i.e., their health
risk) were the focus of the competition.
2.

Group Size

Initially, insurers in the group life market had little concern over
group size. The earliest group life plans covered hundreds or thousands
of workers.62 There was, however, a need to determine an acceptable
minimum group size.63 Experience rating only works if a group’s claims
experience is a reliable predictor of the group’s future claims. This is
response, insurers began to set rates collectively through a rating bureau. But this only worked for a
short period of time, as pricing pressures continued from insurers operating outside the rating
bureau. In response, the bureau insurers were allowed to set “special” (i.e., lower) rates for some
customers based on the firms’ claims and payroll. See id. at 37. Within a few years, insurer
competition and the use of “special rates” had “wrecked” bureau rates. See id. at 38. The term
“experience rating” was first used in 1913 to describe a similar rating scenario in workmen’s
compensation insurance. See id. at 39. In his classic text on health insurance rate making, Duncan
MacIntyre noted, “it could be argued that the theory of insurance equity was developed because of
competition, or to rationalize inequitable practices adopted because of competition . . . .” See id. at
30–31 n.34.
58. See id. at 39. Liability insurance is still thought to function as a form of nongovernmental
safety regulation. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199 (2012) (arguing that insurance can replace or
augment government safety regulation).
59. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 43.
60. See David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance, in 1
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 563, 607 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds.,
2000) (“Whom one pools with in health insurance dramatically affects what one has to pay.”).
61. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 48–49.
62. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
63. See Gregg, supra note 47, at 35 (“Any theoretical exactness in determining a safe minimum
number is not possible. In any case, it should be recognized that no magic number inheres in the
number selected as the minimum, such as ten or twenty-five.”).
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due to the law of large numbers, a probability principle used in the
insurance industry to predict the future claims for a given pool of
insureds. The larger the pool of insureds, the more accurately future
claims can be predicted.64 For smaller groups, claims experience is much
less predictive. Their claims history is simply not large enough for the
law of large numbers, thus “there is no actuarially valid means of
experience rating small firms.”65 Yet, there was little consensus on the
minimum acceptable number of employees for group coverage. The
number drifted downward from 100 to 50,66 and later to 3 employees,67
driven by competitive, rather than actuarial, considerations.68 As
discussed in section II.B, insurers, unable to experience rate small
groups, instead pooled small firms together to create a large enough
number of employees to develop sound rates. The pooling of small
firms, however, created two problems for small group coverage. First,
the pooling of small group risk provided an opportunity for adverse
selection by small employers. Second, it opened the door for “creamskimming” by insurers, “a kind of ‘reverse adverse selection’” in which
insurers “rig” a policy’s incentives to attract healthy/low risk customers
and discourage unhealthy/high risk customers.69
64. This is due to the principle referred to as the law of large numbers. If an insurer provides
coverage for a sufficiently large pool of insureds, the aggregate claims of the group will equal the
expected loss of any individual insured in the pool multiplied by the number of insureds in the pool.
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1540
(1987) (citations omitted); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 30, at 36–40.
65. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 569 (1998).
66. Early legislation of group insurance required no less than 100 lives. See Pierson, supra note
45, at 408. By 1918, the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners adopted a model
definition of group insurance that limited group coverage to no less than fifty employees. Hanft,
supra note 46, at 70, 70 n.1. They believed that at least fifty lives were necessary to support sound
group underwriting. See Graham, supra note 40, at 31. But there is no firm actuarial number for
defining the lower limit of group size for the group model. Thus, the fifty-employee limit was not
universally accepted. Michigan and some other states adopted a standard requiring only twenty-five
lives in 1925. Pierson, supra note 45, at 409–10. By the late 1920s, only a quarter of states had
defined group coverage. Most allowed, but did not legislate group coverage, thereby leaving the
question of minimum group size up to each insurer. See Edwin E. Witte, Group Insurance, 27
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 108, 109 (1928).
67. See Donald D. Cody, Underwriting Group Medical Expense Coverage, in GROUP INSURANCE
HANDBOOK 354, 368 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965).
68. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
69. Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1253. See also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public
Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured: Lessons from International Experience with Private
Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 458 (2001) (cream skimming involves “picking off the better
risks and discouraging high-risk insureds”). Cream skimming simply shifts risks (and higher costs)
“rather than providing a benefit to society.” Id. at 481.
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Competition and Asymmetric Information

While competition is generally thought to produce the best market
outcome, including the lowest prices and the best allocation of
resources,70 this assumption does not necessarily apply in insurance
markets. Asymmetric information can cause a competitive insurance
market to operate inefficiently or even fail.71 Michael Rothschild and
Joseph Stiglitz illustrated this possibility in their classic analysis of
asymmetric information in a competitive insurance market.72
The Rothschild-Stiglitz model was not intended to represent an actual
insurance market.73 Instead, it presents a model that shows how the
presence of asymmetric information can undercut traditional
assumptions about the value of competition in an insurance market.74
The model contemplates two types of insurance buyers, high-risk buyers
(i.e., those more likely to make a claim) and low-risk buyers (i.e., those
less likely to make a claim). The model also assumes information
asymmetry; each customer knows his or her own risk, but insurance
companies do not know the risk of individual customers.75
Rothschild and Stiglitz note that only two kinds of equilibria are
possible.76 The first is a pooling equilibrium, in which high- and low-risk
buyers purchase the same policy.77 Their claims costs are pooled

70. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (arguing that competition produces “the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions”).
71. See, e.g., Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1240 (noting that economists are “fascinated by
adverse selection . . . because it can overturn one of the central tenets of economic theory—that
perfectly competitive markets are efficient”); David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health
Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q.J. ECON. 433, 434–36
(1998) (noting that competition in insurance markets “is somewhat problematic” due to adverse
selection problems); Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 60, at 607 (noting that health insurance
“fundamentally different from other markets in ways that create harmful effects from competition”).
72. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). For a more detailed, but
accessible explanation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, see Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1235–40.
73. Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 72, at 648.
74. Id. at 629 (“We are able to show that not only may a competitive equilibrium not exist, but
when equilibria do exist, they may have strange properties.”).
75. Id. at 632.
76. Id. at 634. Equilibrium means that when consumers choose the best policy for them (they
“maximize expected utility”), insurers have no incentive to stop offering or change the policies they
currently offer. Id. at 633 (“[N]o contract in the equilibrium set makes negative expected
profits . . . [and] no contract outside the equilibrium set . . . will make a nonnegative profit.”).
77. Id. at 634.
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together, resulting in a premium based on the average cost of the highand low-risk buyers. The second is a separating equilibrium in which the
two types of buyers purchase separate policies and their claims costs are
segregated in separate pools.78 Each pool pays a premium based on its
own risk; the low-risk buyers pay a lower premium and the high-risk
buyers pay a higher premium.
Rothschild and Stiglitz first point out that a pooling equilibrium
cannot exist in a competitive market.79 In the pooled policy, the low-risk
buyers pay a premium based on the average costs of the pool of highand low-risk buyers. This means that the less expensive low-risk buyers
subsidize the high-risk buyers. A competing insurer can exploit the lowrisk buyers’ private knowledge of their own risk for its own competitive
advantage. It could offer the low-risk buyers a better deal and peel them
away from the pooled policy. Rothschild and Stiglitz suggest this could
be done by offering a policy with less coverage and lower premiums.
This new policy would attract only the low-risk buyers because the highrisk buyers would prefer to stay fully insured. This would destroy a
pooling equilibrium.80
Next, Rothschild and Stiglitz point out that insurers in a competing
market could offer the high-risk buyers and low-risk buyers different
policies, each of which are designed to attract only one type of customer
(high-risk or low-risk).81 The result would be either a separating
equilibrium or no equilibrium.82 Under this scenario, insurers offer two
types of policies, one with full coverage and full cost and one with less
coverage and a lower cost. The lower-cost policy will be attractive to the
low-risk buyers because of the lower price. It will also be unattractive to
the high-risk buyers because they prefer more coverage. Conversely, the
high-cost policy will be attractive only to the high-risk buyers, because
they desire full coverage, and unattractive to the low-risk buyers because
of price. This will produce a separating equilibrium because each
customer will prefer their own policy. But this does not make everyone
better off. Yes, the low-risk buyers save money by paying a lower
premium, but there is a trade-off. The low-risk buyers sacrifice coverage
to save money. The high-risk buyers are also no better off since they
remain in the full coverage pool and pay a higher premium.83
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 635–36.
Id. at 636.
Id.
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Rothschild and Stiglitz also note the possibility that a separating
equilibrium will not exist at all. If the high-risk buyers are only a small
part of the population, a policy can be designed so that it will attract
high- and low-risk buyers.84 The premium generated by the average
claims cost of the pool will not be so high as to drive off the low-risk
buyers. But this position will not last. In a competitive market, a
competing insurer will offer a slightly less costly policy that will be
more attractive to low-risk buyers. The pooled policy will fail as the
low-risk buyers defect. If the high-risk buyers try to re-pool with the
low-risk customers, the process could replay over and over again,
precluding equilibrium.85 Such a market “might oscillate wildly, or
collapse entirely.”86
D.

Coda

Once introduced, the group life insurance model was quite successful
because it helped solve three significant problems of the individual life
insurance market: adverse selection, high costs, and limited access.
Group coverage also offered a price discount that was unavailable in the
individual market: a tax-subsidized premium. But the group model was
not without significant limits. First, experience rating, the means of
pricing group coverage, can aid loss prevention in some lines of
insurance but not in life or health insurance. Instead, it could be used as
a competitive tool to segregate risk. Second, the success of the group
model is tied to the size of the employer. Small employers have too few
employees to develop rates based on their own claims experience. The
pooling of small employers for sound rates opens the door for adverse
selection by insureds and cream skimming by insurers. Finally, the
normal assumptions about the benefits of competition do not necessarily
apply in an insurance market. Rothschild and Stiglitz demonstrate that
competition in an insurance market may not be beneficial to either the
insureds or the market. The next Part of this Article explores how these
limits shaped the development of group health insurance and its
expansion to small groups.

84. Id. at 636–37.
85. Id.
86. Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1239.
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GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE SMALL GROUP
MARKET

The rapid growth of employer-based group health insurance during
World War II is often described as “a historical accident” propelled by
two favorable federal policies: (1) price and wage controls that prompted
employers to offer health insurance as a wage substitute to attract
workers and (2) changes to the tax code that exempted employer
payments for health coverage from income taxes.87 In the decades
following World War II, employer-based group insurance spread
rapidly, prompted by aggressive union bargaining for health insurance
and non-unionized employers offering generous health coverage in an
attempt to prevent unionization.88 By 1960, employer-based group health
insurance covered over a hundred million people.89 By 2016, over 157
million Americans were covered by employer-based group health
insurance.90
Typically missing from the standard history of group health insurance
is the development of small group coverage and the fundamental
differences between coverage for large and small employers. This Part
fills those gaps. Section II.A describes how rising costs of medical care
drove hospitals to develop the Blue Cross model of group coverage, how
the Blue Cross community-rated model was different from the
experience rated group insurance model, and why group size was largely
irrelevant under the Blue Cross model. Section II.A concludes by
describing how commercial insurers entered the health insurance market
and, using adverse selection to their advantage, brought an end to the
Blue Cross model. Turning to small groups, section II.B explains how
the experience rated model first excluded small groups, but later
included them by pooling small groups together. While small employers
realized some of the benefits of group coverage, protection from adverse
selection was not one of them. The result was an unstable market that
87. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 11, at 25; Moore, supra note 11, at 887–92; Melissa A.
Thomasson, The Importance of Group Coverage: How Tax Policy Shaped U.S. Health Insurance,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1373, 1374 (2003).
88. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 11, at 25–26.
89. Melissa A. Thomasson, From Sickness to Health: The Twentieth-Century Development of
U.S. Health Insurance, 39 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 233, 233–34 (2002) (reporting that health
insurance coverage grew from 12.3 million Americans in 1940 to 122.5 million in 1960).
90. See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=
0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
[https://perma.cc/4TJP-BKAA].
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oscillated severely as health care costs rose in the 1980s and 1990s,
requiring substantial regulation to prevent its disintegration.
A.

Blue Cross and Early Group Health Insurance

1.

The Need to Finance Medical Care

Unlike life insurance, health insurance had no meaningful presence
prior to the twentieth century.91 Simply put, there was no individual
health insurance market because there was little need for insurance to
cover medical expenses. Prior to the 1920s, medical care was both
ineffective and inexpensive. Medical technology was relatively simple,
the ill were usually treated at home, and hospitals were viewed as
“places of death.”92 Loss of income due to illness was a far more
significant problem for workers and their families than the cost of
medical care.93 Improvements in medical technology, anti-infection
techniques, and more demanding education and licensure standards for
physicians improved the quality of and demand for medical care.94 As
the quality of medical care improved in the early twentieth century,
however, its costs increased.95 As hospitals grew in both size and
technical capability, their costs likewise increased—pricing many
middle-class Americans out of the market for hospital care. By the
1920s, the cost of medical care exceeded lost earnings due to sickness
for poor and middle-class families.96 This created financial problems for
both the sick and the hospitals that served them: the sick could not pay
the hospitals, and the hospitals were struggling for cash. The Great
Depression only intensified the financial problems of hospitals. Wealthy
philanthropists, who had long provided financial support to hospitals,
91. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 294 (1982)
(“Before the 1930s, the only extensive private health plans offered direct services, usually to
employees in an industry.”).
92. See Thomasson, supra note 89, at 235 (noting that “the public had little confidence in the
efficacy of medical care”).
93. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE 191–92 (2005). Workers could obtain
some financial protection from the cost of sickness by participating in industrial or fraternal
sickness funds, which provided sick pay to incapacitated workers. See JOHN E. MURRAY, ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN HEALTH INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS FUNDS 3–15 (2007);
Thomasson, supra note 89, at 235 (“[I]nstead of health insurance, ‘sickness’ insurance policies
designed to protect the insured against loss of income developed, while actual health insurance
remained relatively unknown.”).
94. See Thomasson, supra note 89, at 235–36.
95. See STARR, supra note 91, at 259–60.
96. See id. at 258–59.
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substantially reduced their support as their own financial status
declined.97 Full-paying patients were becoming less common while nonpaying patients were proportionately increasing.98 As a result, more than
100 hospitals failed in the first years of the Depression,99 and those that
remained had only about a 50% occupancy rate.100 In absence of
publicly financed health insurance,101 conditions were ripe for a form of
medical care financing that appealed to both hospitals and the middle
class. Yet commercial insurance companies did not offer coverage for
medical expenses. They feared adverse selection, abusive billing, and the
high cost of agent commissions.102
In 1929, the Baylor University Hospital in Dallas, Texas, like many
other hospitals, was struggling to make ends meet.103 Looking to
increase its revenues, Baylor came up with a plan: it began to offer local
employers a prepaid hospitalization plan.104 Baylor had no plans to start
an insurance plan or generate a national movement; it simply wanted to
control its bad debt by generating a steady income from potential
patients.105 The plan was an immediate success.
2.

The Blue Cross Group Model

The Baylor plan was the first step in what would later become Blue
Cross and Blue Shield.106 First offered to Dallas public school teachers,
the Baylor plan guaranteed three weeks of prepaid hospital care in
97. See Fredric R. Hedinger, The Social Role of Blue Cross: Progress and Problems, INQUIRY,
June 1968, at 4.
98. See id.
99. See Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health Insurance,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. Mar. 1994, at 5.
100. Id.
101. For an overview of failed efforts by Progressive reformers to institute a social health
insurance program in the United States in the early 1900s, see STARR, supra note 91, at 240–70.
102. Id. at 294.
103. ROBERT CUNNINGHAM III & ROBERT M. CUNNINGHAM JR., THE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD SYSTEM 4 (1997) (explaining that the hospital was behind on its
bills, overdue by $1.5 million on bond payments, and “just 30 days ahead of the sheriff”).
104. See id. at 5.
105. See id. at viii. In the late 1920s and 1930s, hospitals experienced financial troubles due to the
rising costs of medical care and the economic downturn caused by the Great Depression. See
STARR, supra note 91, at 295–96.
106. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 116 (“[T]he Baylor plan was the forerunner of Blue
Cross.”). Blue Cross and Blue Shield were initially separate organizations, but formally merged in
1982. Blue Cross covered hospital care and Blue Shield covered physician care. See generally
CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 103 (providing a comprehensive history of the
development of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans).
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exchange for a monthly payment of fifty cents.107 As Baylor extended
this arrangement to various employer groups,108 other Dallas hospitals
adopted similar plans.109 Hospitals throughout the country soon followed
suit.110 While each of these initial plans focused on a single hospital,
hospitals began to band together to form community plans.111 Eventually
these plans became known as Blue Cross.112
The Blue Cross model was similar to the group life insurance model
in some ways. Blue Cross initially channeled coverage primarily through
large employer groups.113 This meant lower marketing and
administrative costs just like the group insurance model.114 And, selling
the plan to employer groups reduced adverse selection.115 But the Blue
Cross model was also very different from the group insurance model in
three critical ways.116 First, Blue Cross was not sold on the basis of a
group’s specific risk—there was no experience rating. Blue Cross had a
communitarian orientation,117 and its coverage was community rated.118
This meant that their rates were based on the average claims cost of
everyone covered by a Blue Cross plan. In other words, there was a
single risk pool with a single community rate.119 Second, Blue Cross
plans did not compete with other Blue Cross plans. Each plan was a
107. See ROBERT D. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 10 (1963).
108. See id.
109. See STARR, supra note 91, at 295.
110. See EILERS, supra note 107, at 11.
111. See id. (observing that hospital prepayment plans began to include local hospitals willing to
participate in the plan); STARR, supra note 91, at 296 (noting that by 1932, multi-hospital
prepayment plans were emerging across the country).
112. The Blue Cross symbol was developed in 1934 by E. A. van Steenwyk, a founder of
Minnesota’s Blue Cross plan. CUNNINGHAM & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 103, at 24. The symbol
“perpetuated itself as unifying force” among the newly emerging hospitalization plans. Id. at 33.
113. See id. at 23; MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 126.
114. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 126 (“[T]he plans were able to secure the economies of
group enrollment—no physical examinations, lower acquisition costs, [and] employment-centered
collections.”).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 4 n.8 (noting that although it shared many of the characteristics of an insurer, Blue
Cross was not an insurance company in the legal or technical sense).
117. See Hedinger, supra note 97, at 6–7 (describing the social philosophy of Blue Cross).
118. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 11–12. The term “community rating” was originally
devised by advocates for Blue Cross “to function as a philosophical defense and rallying position
for their rating practices.” Hedinger, supra note 97, at 7.
119. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 11–12. It should be noted that nearly all insured groups
are, to some extent, grouped and priced by the risk of increased costs. Even community rated plans
like Blue Cross differentiated rates based on whether the coverage was for a single subscriber, a
married couple, or a family with dependents. See Hedinger, supra note 97, at 7.
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local monopoly, covering a distinct geographic area.120 The
noncompetitive model meant there was no inter-plan competition for
groups. Thus, there was no cream skimming. In other words, plans had
no incentive to cut rates to gain a competitive advantage or poach lowcost groups from other plans. Third, the community rate and
noncompetitive model made employer group size largely irrelevant.
Unlike the group insurance model, group size was not significant for
pricing coverage. Thus, Blue Cross could offer coverage to small
groups.121
Although its business was overwhelmingly group-based, Blue Cross
did offer individual coverage.122 But Blue Cross individual coverage was
subject to the same adverse selection problems typical of individual
insurance. As a result, Blue Cross plans adopted standard insurance
industry practices with respect to their individual coverage: medical
screening,123 risk-based pricing,124 limited benefits,125 and exclusions126
based on risk. Adverse selection and high administrative costs led to
higher premiums for individual insurance than group coverage.127
3.

The End of the Blue Cross Group Model

The success of Blue Cross convinced commercial insurers that health
insurance was a viable line. Commercial insurers offered individual

120. See STARR, supra note 91, at 297–98.
121. See O.D. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE 161–62 (1963) (Blue Cross offered coverage to
firms as small as two employees); MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 135 (coverage offered to firms as
small as four or five employees). Early on, some Blue Cross plans did suffer adverse selection
problems due to sales of plans to small employer groups and individuals. See CUNNINGHAM &
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 103, at 23 (describing financial troubles experienced by a New York
Blue Cross plan in the 1930s). Those difficulties, however, were largely attributable to lax
enrollment standards. Id. Plan administrators simply did not anticipate that open enrollment and
community rating with lax enrollment oversight would encourage initial enrollment by subscribers
in need of immediate medical care. See id. at 22–23 (noting that “the Plan’s amateur underwriters
had not realized that the first people to sign up for hospitalization would probably either know or
suspect that they had medical problems”).
122. In the mid-1930s a few Blue Cross plans offered individual coverage. By 1959 nearly all
Blue Cross plans sold individual coverage. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 132–33.
123. See EILERS, supra note 107, at 33 (noting that most Blue Cross plans required a medical
history before coverage was issued).
124. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 133.
125. See DICKERSON, supra note 121, at 161; MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 134.
126. Many Blue Cross plans prohibited enrollment past age sixty or sixty-five. MACINTYRE,
supra note 44, at 136.
127. See EILERS, supra note 107, at 308–09.
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coverage,128 which, like other types of individual insurance, was
expensive due to adverse selection and high administrative costs.129
They also entered the group hospitalization market.130 But insurance
companies did not adopt the Blue Cross, community-rated model.
Instead, they turned to the life insurance group model,131 a move that
was disastrous for Blue Cross. Consistent with Rothschild-Stiglitz,
insurers used the group insurance model to carve-up Blue Cross’s pooled
equilibrium. Using experience rating, competing insurers were able to
strip heathy employer groups out of the Blue Cross pool by offering
them their own rate that was lower than the Blue Cross community
average.132 As less costly groups defected from Blue Cross plans, its
community rates—based on the average claims cost of all Blue Cross
subscribers—went up, allowing commercial insurers to attract even
more groups on an experience rated basis133 thereby beginning a death
spiral by adverse selection.134 By 1951, the tide had turned. Whereas
Blue Cross had dominated the group market since its inception,
commercial insurers surpassed Blue Cross in coverage and never looked

128. See J. F. Follmann, Jr., Development and Significance of Group Health Insurance, in GROUP
INSURANCE HANDBOOK 57, 64 tbl.5-2 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965) (setting out
the percentage of hospitalization coverage written by commercial insurers on an individual and
group basis from 1940–1963).
129. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 55–56 (noting loss ratio for individual accident and
health insurance “sometimes averaging 45–55% or premium or less”).
130. See id. at 48 (noting that commercial insurers first sold group hospitalization coverage in 1934).
131. See id. at 37–49 (detailing the development of experience rating and its application in the
employers’ liability and group life lines).
132. This is also referred to as cream skimming. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
133. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 15.
134. A death spiral occurs when “good risks begin to exit [coverage], the average quality of those
insureds remaining falls and prices rise in a vicious circle, ending . . . [when] no one is covered.”
Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1224. A death spiral by adverse selection is the general accepted view
for the collapse of the Blue Cross model of community rating. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL,
REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 40 (1994) [hereinafter HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE
HEALTH INSURANCE] (“Adverse selection forced Blue Cross to abandon community rating in favor
of experience rating for groups . . . .”). But see Melissa A. Thomasson, Did Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Suffer from Adverse Selection? Evidence from the 1950s (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9167, 2002), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9167.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U5XRR26] (questioning the adverse selection narrative based on a finding that Blue Cross subscribers
did not have higher medical costs than enrollees in the experience rated plans of commercial
insurers). Thomasson’s conclusion, while interesting, is not entirely convincing. Her findings were
based on a single year of data (1957), collected long after many Blue Cross plans had switched to
experience rating for some or most of their group business. Thomasson’s data does not disaggregate
claims data from Blue Cross’s experience rated business and community rated group plans. Thus, it
is impossible to tell from Thomasson’s analysis of the group market whether adverse selection
financially disadvantaged Blue Cross group plans that relied on community rating.

04 - Cogan.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

10/1/2018 5:27 PM

ALLOWING THE SMALL GROUP MARKET TO DIE

1147

back.135 Ultimately, Blue Cross was forced to shift its group business to
competitive experience rating in order to survive.136
B.

Small Group Health Coverage Emerges

1.

Experience Rating and Small Groups

The dominance of the group insurance model not only ended Blue
Cross’s community rating, but also prevented some small firms from
obtaining group coverage.137 The insurance laws in some states set a
minimum group size that excluded small groups, and many insurers
would not offer group business to small employers.138 Experience rating
relies on groups large enough to produce their own stable claims history.
Because smaller groups cannot produce that kind of steady claims
experience, they are ill-suited for experience rating.139 But this barrier
did not last for long. Driven by “competitive considerations and the
desire to extend group insurance techniques to a larger share of the
market,”140 insurers expanded group coverage to smaller employers.
This was desirable for smaller employers, who could offer group
coverage and its benefits—no individual underwriting, lower costs, and
a tax subsidy—to their employees.
But the expansion of the group model to small groups posed a
problem: how to accurately establish rates for groups unfit for
experience rating. Ironically, insurers adopted an approach that
resembled the Blue Cross system: community rating.141 Insurers pooled
the claims experience of small employers to develop a basic rate and
then applied group-specific adjustments based on factors such as age.142
135. See Hedinger, supra note 97, at 5.
136. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 14.
137. J. F. Follmann, Jr., The Growth of Group Health Insurance, 32 J. RISK & INS. 105, 110 (1965).
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 36–37, 63–65 and accompanying text.
140. See Robert R. Neal, Health Insurance and the Practicing Lawyer, 1962 A.B.A. SEC. INS.
NEGL. & COMP. L. PROC. 251, 258 (1962); see also Follmann, supra note 137, at 110 (noting that
statutory restrictions were lowered allowing insurers to offer coverage to smaller groups, some as
small as two).
141. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 106–07 (reporting that as the group insurance market
expanded to include smaller groups, insurers pooled small groups for rating purposes); Follmann,
supra note 52, at 413 (noting that small groups were pooled into a community and charged a
community rate).
142. See Mark A. Hall, The Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, HEALTH
AFF. Summer 1992, at 111 [hereinafter Hall, Political Economics of Health Insurance Market
Reform].
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In a sense, the experience rating system was extended to small
employers but only to a pool of small firms, rather than a pool of
employees of one firm, as was the case for large firms. There was,
however, a significant problem with this approach. Unlike employees
who entered the large employer’s risk pool because they sought
employment rather than insurance, small groups entered the new small
group risk pool precisely because they sought insurance. This opened the
door for adverse selection. As a result, small group coverage lacked the
adverse selection protection enjoyed by large group coverage.
2.

Small Groups, Cream Skimming, and Blue Cross Redux

The small group system worked well for a while. But by the 1980s
and early 1990s, the market for small employer coverage began to
disintegrate.143 A sharp escalation in the underlying cost of medical care
drove some insurers to look for a competitive edge as healthier groups
sought cheaper coverage.144 Insurers engaged in cream skimming, in
which they structured their policies to attract healthier/lower risk
customers and discourage less healthy/higher risk customers145—the
same behavior that contributed to the demise of the community-rated
Blue Cross group model. This move intensified competition among all
insurers, leading the industry to abandon its community rating methods
in favor of greater risk selection. Under this new rating regime, insurers
either applied experience rating techniques to small groups, which were
wholly unsuitable and resulted in “highly unstable rating practices,”146 or
they applied “destructive medical underwriting techniques”147 that
treated small groups more like applicants in the individual insurance
market—a market insurers historically approached with trepidation due
to fears of adverse selection.
As a result of insurers’ desire to weed out groups with potentially
costly members, some small groups were turned down while others were
priced out. Insurers also engaged in other risk selection techniques, such
as imposing lengthy exclusions for preexisting conditions, applying
broad coverage exclusions,148 and engaging in post-claims
143. See Mark A. Hall, The Competitive Impact of Small Group Health Insurance Reform Laws,
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 685, 687–89 (1999).
144. See Mark A. Hall, Reforming the Health Insurance Market for Small Businesses, 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 565, 565 (1992) [hereinafter Hall, Reforming the Health Insurance Market].
145. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
146. See Hall, Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, supra note 142.
147. See id.
148. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 134, at 18.
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underwriting.149 Some insurers also engaged in “churning,” a practice
whereby an insurer initially offered a significant discount to a new small
group based on the group’s initial good health profile.150 At renewal
time, however, the insurer imposed huge price increases or refused to
renew altogether, forcing the group to seek coverage from another
insurer.151 These practices resulted in a highly volatile and disintegrating
health insurance market for smaller employers.152 This very much
appeared to be the competitive, no equilibrium market envisioned by
Rothschild and Stiglitz—a market that oscillated and seemed to be on
the verge of collapse.
3.

Small Group Health Insurance Is Reformed

As coverage rates for smaller employers began to plummet, the states
and the federal government, urged on by the insurance industry itself,153
stepped in to stabilize coverage for small employers. By 1997, fortyseven states had enacted small group reform legislation.154 In 1996, the
federal government passed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).155 These laws established a formal small
group market with a dividing line between large and small groups drawn
at fifty employees.156 The reform laws also included components aimed
at reducing risk selection by small group insurers.157 For example, small
group insurers were required to offer coverage on a guaranteed issue and
149. Post claims underwriting, a process by which an insurance company waits until a claim has
been filed to make underwriting decisions (which should have been made when the application was
made) to deny coverage, is a particularly pernicious practice, but one that accomplished the twin
goals of allowing insurers to conduct less stringent (and less costly) upfront evaluations of
applicants while maintaining the ability to exclude, albeit retrospectively, costly individuals once
they submitted their claims. Id. at 19.
150. Id.
151. See HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 134, at 20.
152. See Hall, Reforming the Health Insurance Market, supra note 144, at 565.
153. See id. (noting that insurance industry trade groups proposed extensive regulations to
stabilize coverage for small groups).
154. See M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Effect of “Second Generation” Small Group
Health Insurance Market Reforms, 1993 to 1997, 38 INQUIRY 365, 365 (2001).
155. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
156. The number fifty was thought best for avoiding defection of employers to the self-insured
market, where they would be free from state regulation. See HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE, supra note 134, at 54.
157. See Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health Insurance Regulation: A Guide to Identifying,
Exploiting, and Policing Market Boundaries, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 173, 179
[hereinafter Hall, Geography].
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guaranteed renewal basis. This meant that insurers could not reject a
small employer that applied for or tried to renew coverage if the
employer was willing (and able) to pay the premium. 158 Most states also
imposed restrictions on small group rates. The most commonly used was
rating bands,159 which limited variations in premiums attributable to
health status and other factors.160 A few states used more restrictive
adjusted community rating161 and pure community rating
requirements.162 These regulatory controls constrained the range of
premiums small firms faced when purchasing group coverage and
eliminated abusive rating practices by insurers. But the reforms did not
increase take up in the small group market163 and did not control the high
prices of coverage that discouraged many small firms from purchasing
group insurance.164
More importantly, small group reforms did not eliminate the threat of
adverse selection. Small group rates were still tied to pools of small
employers.165 Since small employers could choose whether to buy
insurance, employers with lower risk and less costly employees could
avoid the high costs of the small group market by electing to self-insure
their employees or by opting out of small group coverage altogether.

158. These requirements were put in place to stop insurers from denying coverage to potentially
costly groups. See id. at 179.
159. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & CTR. FOR INS. POLICY & RESEARCH, HEALTH
INSURANCE
RATE
REGULATION
3
(2011),
https://www.naic.org/
documents/topics_health_insurance_rate_regulation_brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BTJ-M3D3]
(noting that rating bands are “the most prevalent form” of small group rate regulation).
160. See id. at 1.
161. Adjusted community rating bars the use of health status or claims experience in the
calculation of premiums but allows other factors, such as age and geography, to be used. See id.
162. Pure community rating prohibits any factors besides geography to be used when setting
premiums. See id.
163. See Gail A. Jensen & Michael A. Morrisey, Small Group Reform and Insurance Provision
by Small Firms, 1989–1995, 36 INQUIRY 176, 184 (1999) (reporting that small group reforms
adopted between 1989 and 1995 did not expand coverage among small firms); Marquis & Long,
supra note 154, at 377 (finding little evidence that small group reforms lead to any expansion of
coverage among small firms in nine states).
164. See Jensen & Morrisey, supra note 163, at 184 (reporting that nearly all (90%) small firms
surveyed that did not offer their employees group health insurance stated that the high cost was the
most important reason for not offering coverage).
165. Some states required some form of community rates. In states that did not require
community rates, insurers still pooled small groups by classes or blocks. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS & CTR. FOR INS. POLICY & RESEARCH, supra note 159, at 2–3.
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Coda

The group insurance model has been an awkward fit for small
employers, generating problems not typically faced by large groups:
adverse selection, cream skimming, rating difficulties, and market
volatility. Legislative reforms stabilized the market, but the core
problem of adverse selection remained. Prior to the ACA, small
employers that bought small group coverage did benefit from the group
model. They enjoyed the same tax subsidy as large groups, avoided
individual underwriting, and appeared to pay lower administrative costs.
The next Part of this Article examines whether the post-ACA small
group market provides a better deal than individual coverage.
III. SMALL GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE TODAY: DOES IT
DELIVER CORE GROUP BENEFITS?
The ACA changed the way individual and small group health
insurance is pooled, priced, structured, and delivered.166 Although these
changes were substantial and are worthy of extended discussion, the
inquiry in this Article focuses on a specific question: Does the post-ACA
small group market deliver the four core benefits of the group insurance
model? This Part answers this question. Section III.A examines whether
the small group market reduces the risk of adverse selection relative to
the individual market. Next, section III.B surveys cost data to determine
whether the small group market delivers coverage at a lower
administrative expense than the individual market. Section III.C
evaluates whether the small group market provides greater access to
coverage than the individual market. Finally, section III.D examines
whether small group coverage provides a tax subsidy not available in the
individual market.
A.

Adverse Selection in the Individual and Small Group Markets

Recall that adverse selection occurs when insurance purchasers know
more than the insurer about their own risks and use that information
when they buy insurance. In the individual life insurance market,
insurers used individual underwriting to combat adverse selection. But
this came at a cost: high administrative charges and limited access to
insurance. The group model provided an answer to adverse selection by
166. For an overview of the ACA changes to the individual and small group markets, see John G.
Day, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: What Does It Really Do?, 22 CONN. INS. L.J.
121, 135–47 (2016).
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creating a risk pool for reasons independent of the demand for insurance.
Prior to the ACA, adverse selection was a problem for both the small
group and individual markets. After the ACA, adverse selection remains
a problem for both.
1.

Pre-ACA Adverse Selection

Prior to the ACA, the individual market was considered a residual
market,167 where individuals lacking employer-based coverage or who
were not eligible for public insurance programs sought insurance.168
Individuals purchased insurance voluntarily, consequently some
individuals churned in and out of the market as they needed coverage,
while others kept individual coverage long-term.169 Because individuals
had an incentive to purchase insurance only when they thought they
might need medical services, adverse selection was a problem. 170 Indeed,
applicants for coverage were more likely to be high-risk than low-risk.171
This led insurers to use underwriting and risk-based pricing to control
risk. Insurers denied coverage to high-risk applicants and priced
enrollees based on their risk.172
As noted in Part II, adverse selection was also a problem in the small
group market before the ACA. Because small group employers entered
the small group market for the purpose of buying insurance, the adverse
selection problem in that market was similar to the adverse selection
problem in the individual health insurance market. Since small
employers could use their own risk information when deciding to buy
167. See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market
and Prospects for Change, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 79, 79–80 (noting that “only a small
share of the nonelderly population purchases individual insurance”).
168. See Gary Claxton et al., Pre-existing Conditions and Medical Underwriting in the Individual
Insurance Market Prior to the ACA, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 2 (Dec. 12 2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Pre-existing-Conditions-and-Medical-Underwriting-inthe-Individual-Insurance-Market-Prior-to-the-ACA
[https://perma.cc/2QC5-WW94].
Public
insurance programs include Medicare and Medicaid.
169. See id.
170. See Mark V. Pauly & Len M. Nichols, The Nongroup Health Insurance Market: Short on
Facts, Long on Opinions and Policy Disputes, HEALTH AFF. W325, W326 (Oct. 23, 2002),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/452d/a53571e394a98f2d71ddc4a753d604962638.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NR8J-EKUE] (arguing that insurers’ fear of adverse selection results in
underwriting and pricing practices).
171. Mark J. Browne, Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market,
59 J. RISK & INS. 13 (1992).
172. See Buntin et al., supra note 167, at 81 (noting that “those who buy coverage tend to be
healthier than those who remain uninsured, even though we expect demand for insurance to be
greatest among the sick”).
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coverage, this gave them the option of buying coverage in the small
group market, self-insuring, or skipping coverage all together.173
2.

Post-ACA Adverse Selection

Part of the ACA’s individual market reforms included making
individual insurance more accessible. Once the ACA market reforms
took effect in 2014, insurers in the individual market were no longer
allowed to deny coverage or charge higher premiums based on an
applicant’s health status or medical history.174 Insurers could only
determine premiums on a community rated basis, with limited
adjustments for age, tobacco use, and geographic location.175 This raised
the risk of adverse selection by barring insurers from using their main
tools to combat adverse selection. However, the ACA also included
provisions to reduce adverse selection. The ACA imposed an individual
mandate that required most Americans to maintain a minimum level of
health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty.176 The ACA also
provided subsidies for low- and moderate-income individuals and
households to help them purchase insurance.177 Moreover, the ACA also
made it harder for people to delay purchasing insurance until they were
sick by limiting open enrollment periods.178
Nevertheless, adverse selection remains a concern in the individual
market. For example, the individual market has attracted more older than
younger adults.179 In addition, Congress and the Trump administration
have taken actions that could increase adverse selection in the individual
market. Specifically, Congress repealed the individual mandate,
effective December 31, 2018.180 The Congressional Budget Office has
estimated that the repeal of the individual mandate will cause fewer
173. Indeed, low risk group declined in coverage following the 1990s reforms, consistent with
adverse selection. See Kosali Ilayperuma Simon, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets?
Evidence from State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1865, 1872 (2005)
(noting that coverage rates declined for low risk workers after reforms).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012) (guaranteed availability of coverage); id. § 300gg-2 (guaranteed
renewability of coverage); id. § 300gg-3 (prohibition of preexisting condition exclusion); id.
§ 300gg-4 (prohibition of discrimination based on health status).
175. Id. § 300gg.
176. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 539 (2012) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A
(2012)).
177. See infra section III.D.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b).
179. John A. Graves & Sayeh S. Nikpay, The Changing Dynamics of US Health Insurance and
Implications for the Future of the Affordable Care Act, 36 HEALTH AFF. 297, 303 (2017).
180. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017).
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healthy people to buy insurance, reducing individual market coverage by
13 million people by 2027.181 The repeal is also expected to cause
premiums to rise about 10% per year for the next decade.182 In addition,
the Trump Administration has promulgated regulations that allow the
sale of low cost, low coverage “short-term” insurance.183 Insurers
offering this coverage could siphon (or, cream skim) low-risk insureds
from the individual market and drive up individual market premiums.184
The small group market also remains subject to adverse selection
problems. Post-ACA, insurers in the small group market are also barred
from charging higher premiums based on the health status, medical
history, or other risk factors of the employees of a small employer. Small
group coverage is also community rated, subject to limited adjustments
based on age, smoking, and geography.185 All of this increases the risk of
adverse selection. Finally, unlike the large group market, there remains
no rule that requires small employers to either provide health coverage
to their employees or pay a penalty.186 Small groups can still opt out of
coverage if they find it too expensive, or they can self-insure. Indeed, the
number of small employers self-insuring has risen from 13.2% in
2013,187 the year before the ACA insurance market reforms took effect,
to 17.4% in 2016.188 Moreover, the Trump Administration has
181. CONG. BUDGET OFF., REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE: AN
UPDATED
ESTIMATE
3
(2017),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-20172018/reports/53300-individualmandate.pdf [https://perma.cc/72F9-PNDG].
182. Id.
183. Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,212, 38,212 (Aug. 3, 2018) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 148) (effective on October 2, 2018).
184. See Robert Pear, Trump Moves to Relax Rules on Cheaper Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/politics/trump-cheaper-healthinsurance.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (“Some health policy experts say that if large numbers of
healthy people buy short-term coverage, it could drive up premiums for those who remain in
Affordable Care Act plans.”).
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-4 (2012).
186. See Day, supra note 166, at 146.
187. 2013 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component National-Level Summary
Tables, Table I.A.2.a Percent of Private-sector Establishments that Offer Health Insurance that
Self-Insure at Least One Plan by Firm Size and Selected Characteristics: United States (2013),
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2013),
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2013/tia2a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6P6-HBBY].
188. 2016 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Insurance Component National-Level Summary
Tables, Table I.A.2.a Percent of Private-sector Establishments that Offer Health Insurance that
Self-insure at Least One Plan by Firm Size and Selected Characteristics: United States (2016),
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2016),
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2016/tia2a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8L9-4TGN].
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promulgated a regulation that permits small firms to offer coverage
purchased through associations rather than through the small group
market.189 This regulation allows small firms to offer less expensive
coverage exempt from small group market requirements.190
In sum, post-ACA, both the individual and small group markets are
subject to adverse selection, and the small group market appears to
provide no greater protection from adverse selection than the individual
market.
B.

Administrative Costs in the Individual and Small Group Markets

The group model lowered administrative costs by eliminating the
expense of individual underwriting, spreading fixed per-contract costs
across a larger pool of insureds, and by transferring some administrative
duties to the employer. Prior to the ACA, available data seemed to
suggest that the small group market delivered a better deal on
administrative costs than the individual market. Data now available
shows that the small group market offers no better deal on administrative
costs. In fact, administrative costs are higher for the small group market,
due to the costs of brokers and agents.
1.

Pre-ACA Administrative Costs

Prior to the ACA, there was little publicly available information on
how much insurers spent on administrative costs.191 Administrative costs
were typically reported as the medical loss ratio (MLR), a percentage of
the premium paid for medical claims.192 Although there was no standard
formula for calculating MLRs,193 the MLR statistic was widely used by
insurers, regulators, and many others for a variety of purposes, including
189. Definition of ‘‘Employer’’ under section 3(5) of ERISA—Association Health Plans, 83 Fed.
Reg. 28,912, 28,912 (June 21, 2018) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2150).
190. See Robert Pear, Trump Proposes New Health Plan Options for Small Businesses, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/trump-association-healthplans-obamacare.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
191. Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Policy Brief: Medical Loss Ratio, HEALTH AFF. 1 (Nov. 24,
2010),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20101124.949788/full/healthpolicybrief_33.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZBA-J6AZ].
192. James C. Robinson, Use and Abuse of the Medical Loss Ratio to Measure Health Plan
Performance, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at 176, 176 (“In principle, this statistic measures the
fraction of total premium revenue that health plans devote to clinical services, as distinct from
administration and profit.”).
193. Id. at 177–81, 186 (noting that MLR “is not a straightforward indicator of either medical or
administrative expenditures”); see also Haberkorn, supra note 191, at 2 (noting that the meaning of
MLR differed among states because they “defined what constitutes medical care differently”).
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as an indicator of administrative efficiency.194 Large groups tended to
have the highest MLRs ranging from the low eighties to the low
nineties.195 This meant that administrative costs and profits in the large
group market varied from under 10% to nearly 20% of premiums. The
individual market typically had the lowest MLRs, ranging from the low
sixties to the eighties,196 meaning that administrative costs comprised
between 20% to nearly 40% of premiums. The small group market fell
in-between, with MLRs ranging from the high seventies to the mideighties.197 Small group administrative costs and profits ranged from
15% to the just over 20%. This seems to suggest that, while small group
administrative costs were high, they were generally not as high as those
in the individual market—an apparent benefit of the group model.
But use of the MLR statistic as means of comparing administrative
expenses across markets can be misleading. The MLR shows
administrative costs as a percentage of premium rather than in dollars
spent per person. Because premiums across the three markets varied,
MLR figures are not particularly useful for cross-market administrative
cost comparisons. Individual market plans typically provide less
coverage at a lower premium, so they have fewer premium dollars over
which to spread their administrative costs.198 This yields a higher MLR
in the individual market per administrative dollar spent than in the large
and small group markets.

194. Robinson, supra note 192, at 177 (“Despite the difficulties in access and interpretation, the
medical loss ratio has achieved in recent years a remarkable amount of publicity and even
notoriety.”).
195. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: SMALL EMPLOYERS
CONTINUE TO FACE CHALLENGES IN PROVIDING COVERAGE 14 (2001) [hereinafter GAO SMALL
EMPLOYERS], https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232978.pdf [https://perma.cc/L26R-3FEP] (reporting
large group administrative costs at “about 10 percent of large employers’ premiums,” an MLR of
90%); Haberkorn, supra note 191, at 2 (noting that the nation’s largest health insurers reported 2009
MLRs for the large group market ranging from 83%–88%); Hall, supra note 157, at 174 (reporting
that large group MLRs “typically run in the high 80s or low 90s”).
196. See, e.g., Hall, Geography, supra note 157, at 175 (reporting individual market MLRs in the
“60s to mid-70s”); Haberkorn, supra note 191, at 2 (reporting 2009 MLRs for the individual market
ranging from 68%–88%).
197. See, e.g., GAO SMALL EMPLOYERS, supra note 195 (reporting small employer
administrative costs at “about 20 percent to 25 percent,” an MLR of 75–80%); Haberkorn, supra
note 191, at 2 (noting that the nation’s largest health insurers reported 2009 MLRs for the large
group market ranging from 83%–88%); Hall, Geography, supra note 157, at 175 (reporting small
group market MLRs in the “high 70s to mid-80s”).
198. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND FEDERAL POLICY 35
(2016),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51130Health_Insurance_Premiums.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NU4L-5866]
(Appendix:
Insurers’
Administrative Costs and Profits).
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Post-ACA Administrative Costs

The ACA now requires all insurers to file detailed financial reports
annually.199 The data from these reports allows more precise calculations
of administrative costs. Now, administrative costs can be measured in
dollars spent per each enrollee, rather than just as a percentage of
premium. The new data show the small group market has higher
administrative costs than the individual market.
Using 2010 to 2012 data, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
analyzed administrative costs for the large group, small group, and
individual markets.200 The CBO found that, as a share of premiums,
administrative costs in the individual market were higher than those in
the small group market, 20% versus 16%. This finding was consistent
with the prior MLR approach. But when administrative costs were
measured in average dollars paid by each enrollee, the small group
market’s administrative costs were 25% higher than those in the
individual market. As seen in Table 1, per enrollee administrative
charges—the average number of dollars spent by each enrollee to cover
administration costs—were higher in the small group market. Annual
administrative costs in the small group market averaged $687 in 20102012. In the individual market, administrative costs averaged $548 per
year.

199. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (2012).
200. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 198, at 36 tbl.A-1.
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Table 1:
Insurers’ Average Annual Administrative Costs per Enrollee,
2010–2012201
Administrative Costs
Claims Processing
and Adjustment
Taxes and Fees
Sales, Marketing, and
Brokers’ Fees
Other Administrative
Costs
Total Administrative
Costs

Small Group Market
$103

Individual Market
$96

$159
$226

$74
$157

$200

$221

$687

$548

For the two markets, the CBO found that cost of claims processing
was roughly similar ($103 and $96 per enrollee) as were “other”
administrative costs ($200 and $221 per enrollee). The two biggest
differences were in taxes ($159 and $74 per enrollee) and sales,
marketing, and brokers’ fees ($226 and $157 per enrollee). The tax
difference resulted from higher profits in the small group market, which
translated into higher tax costs passed on through premium.202 The most
significant difference was the cost of sales, marketing, and brokers’ fee,
which were 44% higher in the small group market ($226 and $157 per
enrollee).203
An analysis by the actuarial firm Milliman produced similar results
for the years 2010 and 2012 to 2015. Table 2 shows average per member
per month administrative expenses for the small group and individual
markets. Again, based on the Milliman analysis, the small group market
was more expensive every year but 2014, when the costs were roughly
the same ($48.49 versus $48.55).204

201. Id. CBO analyzed administrative data derived from two sources: insurers’ 2010 filings of the
Supplemental Health Care Exhibit with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and
insurers’ 2011 and 2012 filings of the Medical Loss Ratio Annual Reporting Form with Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Id. at 35.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The Milliman figures do not include taxes and fees.
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Table 2:
Administrative Costs per Member per Month, 2010, 2012–2015
Year
2010205
2012206
2013207
2014208
2015209

Small Group Market
$43.83
$44.38
$46.37
$48.49
$51.94

Individual Market
$40.31
$38.30
$43.09
$48.55
$48.19

Milliman also noted that the biggest difference between the two
markets were the broker and agent fees, which were substantially higher
in the small group market.210
The group model lowers costs, in part, by transferring some
administrative functions from the insurer to the firm. Small firms,
lacking the resources to hire a staff, rely on insurance agents and brokers
to perform many of the functions of a human resources staff.211 Most

205. JILL S. HERBOLD, MILLIMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES: 2010 COMMERCIAL HEALTH
INSURANCE
5
fig.1,
8
(2012)
[hereinafter
MILLIMAN
2010],
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/health-published/commercial-health-insuranceadmin-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7NV-NTUK].
206. MILLIMAN 2012, supra note 7, at 1 fig.1.
207. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS ET AL., MILLIMAN, 2013 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
OVERVIEW
OF
FINANCIAL
RESULTS
1
fig.1
(2014),
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2014/2013-commercial-health-insurance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H687-V29J].
208. See PAUL R. HOUCHENS ET AL., MILLIMAN, 2014 COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
OVERVIEW
OF
FINANCIAL
RESULTS
5
fig.3
(2016),
http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2016/2014-commercial-health-insurance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MEA-PG3C].
209. MILLIMAN 2015, supra note 6, at 6 fig.4.
210. MILLIMAN 2012, supra note 7, at 2 (“Agents and broker fees in the individual market are
more than 40% less than the small group market on a PMPM basis.”). See also MILLIMAN 2010,
supra note 205, at 5 fig.1, 8 (noting that “[t]hese significant differences between the market
averages for agents and brokers fees and commissions account for the majority of the difference in
total administrative expenses by market”).
211. Jon R. Gabel et al., Small Employer Perspectives on the Affordable Care Act’s Premiums,
SHOP Exchanges, and Self-Insurance, 32 HEALTH AFF. 2032, 2034 (2013) (“Insurance agents and
brokers play major roles in small employers’ purchasing decisions, often serving as de facto benefit
managers.”); LESLIE JACKSON CONWELL, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF
NO.
57:
THE
ROLE
OF
HEALTH
INSURANCE
BROKERS
3
(2002),
http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/480/480.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9VM-PECW] (noting that
small employers “tend to view brokers as their benefits staff”).
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small firms that buy insurance use brokers and agents.212 Brokers and
agents provide extensive services, including helping firms select health
plans, educating employees about benefits, enrolling employees,
determining employee premium contributions, and helping employees
appeal denied claims.213 But these services come with a price. Brokers
fees of up to 8% of premium214 are built-in to all premiums rather than
charged directly to small firms. Thus, all small employers pay for
brokers and agents, even if they do not use them.215
In sum, the small group health market offers no administrative cost
savings. While cost savings through the transfer of some administrative
functions from the insurer to the employer may work for a large
employer, it does not work for a small employer. The small employer
must rely on agents and brokers to perform those functions. The costs of
those services are simply loaded into premiums and transferred back to
the small firms, resulting in higher administrative costs.
C.

Access to Insurance in the Individual and Small Group Markets

Access to insurance is the most straightforward of the group model’s
four core benefits. The group model jettisoned individual underwriting
as a prerequisite for life insurance, thereby extending the availability of
life insurance to those who would have been denied coverage in the
individual market. Prior to the ACA, the small group market offered the
same access benefit: small group employees were not subject to
individual underwriting as a litmus test for coverage, although the
benefit was provided by statute, not purely through the group model. On
the other hand, applicants for individual coverage were subject to
exclusion through underwriting. After the ACA, underwriting was
eliminated in the individual market and middle- and lower-income
applicants to that market were eligible for subsidized coverage, blunting
the high cost of health insurance, which can be a significant barrier to
coverage. These changes eliminated the access benefit of the small
group market.

212. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2034 (noting that 80% of small firms that offer coverage
use a broker or agent). A broker is an independent agent who works with many insurers. Agents
work with a single insurer. See CONWELL, supra note 211, at 2.
213. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2034–35.
214. See CONWELL, supra note 211, at 2.
215. See id.
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Pre-ACA Access

Because medical underwriting was permitted in the individual
insurance market in forty-five states and the District of Columbia prior
to the ACA,216 individual insurance was difficult for many Americans to
purchase.217 More than one in six applicants were denied when applying
for coverage in the individual market,218 and many others simply did not
apply because they knew they would be denied.219 Even if a person were
not denied, their medical history could result in higher rates, an
exclusion of a specified condition, higher deductibles, or limited or
modified benefits.220 In fact, by one estimate, over one quarter of the
population today would be ineligible for coverage under pre-ACA
underwriting.221
In contrast, while group coverage was “almost invariably” written
without individual underwriting prior to the 1960s,222 by the early 1990s,
40% of small groups and 20% of large firms used medical underwriting
to exclude workers for specific preexisting conditions.223 This changed
after passage of HIPAA in 1996. Thereafter, individual underwriting
was banned in the group health markets. HIPAA prohibited group health
plans from excluding individuals from a group or charging them higher
premiums based on their health status.224 HIPAA also included
guaranteed issue and renewability provisions that prevented insurers
from refusing coverage to small groups based on the cost of their

216. See Claxton et al., supra note 168, at 3.
217. Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is Not a
Viable Option for Most U.S. Families, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2 (July 21, 2009),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_iss
ue_brief_2009_jul_failure_to_protect_1300_doty_failure_to_protect_individual_ins_market_ib_v2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QR3K-SZDK] (“[N]early half (47%) of adults who tried to purchase insurance
in the individual market in the last three years found it very difficult or impossible to find a plan that
fit their needs.”).
218. Claxton et al., supra note 168, at 2 (estimating that 18% of individual market applicants
were denied coverage); see also Buntin et al., supra note 167, at 81 (noting estimates of denials
range from 8% to 18% of applicants).
219. See Claxton et al., supra note 168, at 2–3.
220. See id. at 6.
221. See id. at 2, tbl.1 (noting that 27% of adult Americans under the age of sixty-five have health
conditions that would likely leave them uninsurable in the pre-ACA individual market).
222. See MACINTYRE, supra note 44, at 63.
223. See Joel C. Cantor et al., Private Employment-Based Health Insurance in Ten States,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 199, 205.
224. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), (b) (2012).
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employees.225 Nevertheless, access was limited by price and low offer
rates. Although most states imposed some restrictions on premiums,
such as rating bands, to prevent insurers from pricing out employers with
high-cost employees,226 high premiums still affected access. High prices
have been the main reason small employers do not offer coverage.227
And the percentage of small employer not offering coverage has grown
from about half in the early 1990s to roughly two-thirds today.228
2.

Post-ACA Access

After the ACA, underwriting is prohibited in the individual market.
Access to coverage is guaranteed.229 The ACA prohibits discriminationbased health status230 and preexisting conditions,231 and insurers may
vary premiums only on family status, geographic rating area, age, and
tobacco use.232 And, as described in section III.D, the ACA offers tax
subsidized coverage to middle- and lower-income applicants, reducing
cost as a barrier to health coverage.
The same access and rating provisions also apply to the small group
market, giving the two markets similar access requirements. However,
two additional potential access limits should be considered. First, the
small group offers no special tax subsidy to the households most
burdened by the cost of health insurance—middle- and lower-income
households. Second, less than one-third of small group employers now
offer group health coverage.233
In short, the post-ACA small group health market offers no access
advantage over the individual market.

225. For a detailed explanation of HIPAA’s guaranteed issue and renewal requirement for small
groups, see Jack A. Rovner, Federal Regulation Comes to Private Health Care Financing: The
Group Health Insurance Provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 183, 207–09 (1998).
226. See supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.
227. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2034 (finding that 75% of small firms not offering
insurance cite the high cost as the reason coverage not offered).
228. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (2012). This is subject to enrollment periods. Id. § 300gg-1(b).
230. Id. § 300gg-4.
231. Id. § 300gg-3.
232. Id. § 300gg(a).
233. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Tax Subsidy in the Individual and Small Group Market

Finally, does the small group market deliver a better tax subsidy than
individual coverage? Prior to the ACA, the answer was unequivocally
“yes.” Now, the answer rests on the employee’s household income. To
be clear, employer-based group coverage still offers a tax subsidy. But
for some employees—those with low or moderate household incomes—
the individual market may offer a better tax subsidy.
1.

Pre-ACA Tax Subsidy

Before the ACA, federal law generally offered little tax subsidy to
those who purchased health insurance in the individual market.234
Individuals paid premiums with after-tax dollars.235 In comparison,
group premiums paid by an employer on behalf of an employee were not
treated as employees’ taxable income236 and employee contributions to
premiums were paid with pre-tax dollars if made through a cafeteria
plan.237 The result was a significant advantage for employer-based group
health insurance over the individual market. The subsidies lowered the
price of insurance purchased through an employer relative to the
individual insurance market.238 This played a critical role in the growth

234. Self-employed individuals may deduct the cost of their own health insurance premiums as
well as the premiums they paid for their dependents as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
I.R.C. § 162(l) (West 2006). Also, employees were allowed to purchase their own health insurance
and then seek reimbursement in pre-tax dollars from their employer. See infra note 302 and
accompanying text.
235. David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform:
Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income
Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 676 (2012).
236. I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 106(a) (West 2012). Group health insurance premiums are also excludable
from payroll taxes. I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), (b), 3121(a)(2) (West 2012).
237. I.R.C. § 125. Legislation authorizing cafeteria plans was enacted in 1978. Revenue Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 96-600, tit. I, § 134, 92 Stat. 2763, 2783 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 125).
238. Employees are thought to pay the employer’s contribution in the form of lower wages. See
Linda J. Blumberg, Who Pays For Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Nov.Dec. 1999, at 59 (“Economists tend to agree that, based upon both theory and the best empirical
evidence, workers bear a large portion of health insurance costs through reduced wages.”); David A.
Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance and Universal Coverage: Four Things People Know
That Aren’t So, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 435, 437 (2009) (“[E]mployees actually foot
the bill in the form of foregone salary and other benefits.”). The tax benefit makes the wage-benefit
tradeoff a good deal since dollars paid in the form of wages are taxed but dollars paid in the form of
on health insurance benefits are not. For an illustration of the tax benefit of group insurance, see
Amy B. Monahan, The Complex Relationship Between Taxes and Health Insurance, 3–4 (Univ. of
Minn. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-01, 2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531322 (last visited Aug. 8, 2018)
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of employer-based group health insurance. As Melissa Thomasson has
noted, “[b]y fostering an increase in the demand for group insurance
relative to individual coverage, [the tax benefit] . . . ensured that health
insurance in the United States would evolve as a group, employmentbased system.”239
Significantly, the tax subsidy of employer-provided insurance did not
depend on the size of the firm,240 but the subsidy may have been a more
important benefit for small firms. Relying on variations in tax subsidies
across Canadian provinces and U.S. states, economist Mark Stabile
showed that provinces and states that offered greater tax subsidies for
employer-provided insurance tended to have more small firms offer
insurance than provinces or states that offered smaller tax subsidies.241
Without the tax subsidy, Stabile concluded, about half of small firms (25
or fewer employees) would no longer offer coverage, while a loss of tax
benefits would have little effect on the larger firms, most likely because
the other benefits of group coverage still made large group coverage a
better deal than individual coverage.242
2.

Post-ACA Tax Subsidy

Although the ACA changed some tax laws that affected employerbased group coverage,243 the tax benefits for employer-provided health
insurance remained largely the same. However, the ACA substantially
changed the tax laws for purchasers in the individual market by
providing: (1) a premium tax credit to subsidize the purchase of health

(demonstrating how a pre-ACA taxpayer in the 25% marginal tax bracket receives a subsidy of
$1,412 by buying health insurance through an employer’s group plan).
239. Thomasson, supra note 87, at 1374.
240. Rather, the subsidy depended on the marginal tax rate of each employee. Mark Stabile, The
Role of Tax Subsidies in the Market for Health Insurance, 9 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 33, 48 (2002).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 47–48.
243. The most notable is the ACA’s so-called Cadillac Tax, which imposed a 40% excise tax on
employer contributions to health plans considered overly generous. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. IX, § 9901, 124 Stat. 199, 848 (2010) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 4980I (2012)). Congress suspended its operation until 2020. Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. P, tit. I, § 101(a), 129 Stat. 2242, 3037 (2015).
Small employers with fewer than twenty-five full-time employees and average wages of less than
$50,000 were also offered a tax credit to provide health insurance to employees. The employer had
to pay at least 50% of the cost of such coverage. The credit is only available for two consecutive
taxable years. I.R.C. §§ 45R(d), (e)(2). For a discussion of the ACA’s tax provisions, see Gamage,
supra note 235, at 686–92.
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insurance244 and (2) cost sharing subsidies to reduce out-of-pocket costs,
such as deductibles, coinsurance, and copays.245 But not all individual
market purchasers are eligible for these subsidies. Subsidies are only
available for policies purchased through state246 or federal247 health
insurance exchanges.248 To be eligible for the premium tax credit,
purchasers must have a household income between 100% and 400%
FPL.249 To receive the cost sharing subsidies, purchasers must have
income between 100% and 250% of FPL.250 Employees and dependents
offered “affordable” health insurance by an employer are also not
eligible for the subsides.251
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate how the subsidies work. Table 3252 estimates
the premium tax credits, cost sharing subsidies, and total subsidy for a
family of four with a single earner who bought health insurance from a
state or federal exchange in 2016.253 The premium tax credit subsidies
are highest at 100% of FPL254 and thereafter decrease as the purchaser’s
household income approaches 400% FPL. Likewise, the value of the
cost sharing subsidies peaks at 100% FPL and decreases as the
purchaser’s income approaches 250% FPL. Above 400% FPL, buyers
receive no subsidies.

244. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401(a), 124 Stat.
119, 213 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36B (2012)).
245. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1402, 124 Stat.
119, 220 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012)).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 18031.
247. Id. § 18041.
248. Health insurance exchanges (also called marketplaces) are online markets in which
individuals and small businesses can purchase health insurance. For an overview of the health
insurance exchanges, see generally VANESSA C. FORSBERG, CONG. RESEARC. SERV., No. R44065,
OVERVIEW
OF
HEALTH
INSURANCE
EXCHANGES
1–13
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44065.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK5D-GQAB].
249. I.R.C. § 36B (West 2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(b) (2017).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 18071; 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(g) (2017).
251. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B) (2012), (C); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(c)(3) (2017).
252. Table 3 is adapted from Gamage, supra note 235, at 688 tbl.1, which was adapted from
STEPHANIE RENNANE & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, TAX POLICY CTR., HEALTH REFORM: A TWOSUBSIDY SYSTEM (2010), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/numbers/
content/PDF/S10-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/25JL-FXXT].
253. While the figures in this table may vary under the new tax law, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017), the underlying analysis remains the same. Households will
receive subsidies at 100% that decrease as income approaches 400% of FPL.
254. From 100% FPL to 133% FPL, households are also eligible for Medicaid coverage in those
states that expanded Medicaid eligibility under the ACA. See Gamage, supra note 235, at 687 n.93.
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Table 3:
Estimated Value of Exchange Subsidies (Family of Four, 2016)
Household
Income
(% of FPL)

Household
Income
(Cash)

100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425
450

$24,000
$30,000
$36,000
$42,000
$48,000
$54,000
$60,000
$66,000
$72,000
$78,000
$84,000
$90,000
$96,000
$102,000
$108,000

Premium
Tax
Credits
(PTC)
$13,598
$13,473
$12,595
$11,738
$10,940
$9,869
$9,053
$7,776
$6,952
$6,468
$5,761
$5,165
$4,570
-

Cost
Sharing
Subsidies
(CSS)
$4,834
$4,834
$3,021
$3,021
$604
$604
-

Total
Exchange
Subsidy
(PTC+CSS)
$18,433
$18,307
$15,617
$14,759
$11,544
$10,473
$9,053
$7,776
$6,952
$6,468
$5,761
$5,165
$4,570
-

Table 4255 shows the gains and losses for a family of four if it buys
subsidized individual market coverage rather than receive employerbased group coverage. Based on the assumptions of this model,256 the
tradeoff point for a family of four is right around 400% FPL. A family of
four with income at or below 400% FPL will realize a financial gain by
buying subsidized coverage in the individual market rather than through
255. See Gamage, supra note 235, at 696 tbl.2.
256. The analysis makes several simplifying assumptions that are implied in the data. First, the
employer offers only cash wages or cash wages and health insurance benefits. See Rennane &
Steuerle, supra note 252, at 2 n.5. Second, individuals and families get the same health plan in the
individual market and from the employer, with a premium of $5,200 and cost sharing of $1,900 for
individuals or a premium of $14,100 and cost sharing of $5,000 for families. See id. at 2 tbl.1, cols.
(C), (C’), (D), (D’), 4 tbl.3, cols. (C), (C’), (D), (D’). Third, the employer’s costs per employee are
the same regardless of whether the employer offers group coverage. See id. at 2 tbl.1, cols. (R), (R’),
4 tbl.3, cols. (R), (R’). Finally, the analysis does not consider income from sources other than the
employer. Although these assumptions simplify the calculations, they do not alter the final analysis:
from a tax subsidy perspective, households with lower incomes will be better off choosing
subsidized individual coverage while households with higher incomes will be better off choosing
employer-based group coverage.
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group coverage. Conversely, if the family’s income exceeds 400% FPL,
it will be worse off if it buys subsidized coverage in the individual
market rather than through group coverage.
Table 4:
Estimated Household Gain/Loss in Tax Subsidies
After Switch to Exchange from Small Group Insurance
(Family of Four, 2016)
Household
Income
(% of FPL)
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375
400
425
450

Household
Income
(Cash)
$24,000
$30,000
$36,000
$42,000
$48,000
$54,000
$60,000
$66,000
$72,000
$78,000
$84,000
$90,000
$96,000
$102,000
$108,000

Total
Exchange
Subsidy
$18,433
$18,307
$15,617
$14,759
$11,544
$10,473
$9,053
$7,776
$6,952
$6,468
$5,761
$5,165
$4,570
-

Total
Increase in
Paid Taxes
$(124)
$2,297
$4,568
$5,536
$5,456
$4,493
$3,544
$3,544
$3,544
$3,544
$3,544
$3,544
$3,544
$3,544
$4,134

Net Benefit
of Exchange
Coverage257
$18,557
$16,010
$11,049
$9,223
$6,088
$5,980
$5,509
$4,232
$3,408
$2,924
$2,217
$1,621
$1,026
($3,544)
($4,134)

The tradeoff point will vary depending on household size. But, for
households eligible for subsidized individual coverage, there is an
income level at which they would realize a larger tax subsidy by
purchasing health insurance in the individual market. The tradeoff point
for a family of four in 2016 is an annual income of just above $96,000.
In sum, post-ACA, the small group market offers only a partial tax
subsidy advantage over the individual market. For households with
incomes at or below 400% FPL, the individual market offers a better
257. Since this table assumes only small group coverage, Table 4 does not include a reduction for
the employer mandate. Gamage and Rennane & Steuerle both incorporate the employer mandate
and assume the cost of the mandate penalty is passed along to the employee. Gamage, supra note
235, at 696–97, 696 tbl.3; Rennane & Steuerle, supra note 252, at 2 tbl.1.
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deal. For higher income households, the small group market still offers a
better subsidy than the individual market.
This split benefit raises a difficult question. Given its decline, should
the small group market be sustained to support this one benefit? While
tax subsidies have played an influential role in the group health markets,
it would seem arbitrary to sustain the small group market solely to
deliver a tax benefit for one group: high-income households.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE POSSIBLE
DEMISE OF THE SMALL GROUP MARKET
As the analysis in Part III demonstrates, the small group market fails
to deliver the core benefits of group insurance, with the exception of the
tax subsidy for high-income households. This Part discusses additional
considerations raised by these findings. First, section IV.A examines
whether small group coverage provides consumer benefits, aside from
the core benefits, that might weigh in favor of preserving the market.
Section IV.A asks two questions. First, are people more likely to acquire
and maintain health coverage if it is provided through a group rather
than the individual market, all else being equal? Second, are employers
better than employees at selecting health insurance that more closely
meets the needs of the employees? Next, section IV.B queries whether
small group insurance benefits employers. Is there a business case for
small employers to preserve small group coverage? Section IV.C briefly
discusses various policy changes that have been suggested as ways to
improve the small group market and considers whether these potential
fixes would help the small group market deliver group benefits. Finally,
section IV.D identifies the main winners and losers if the small group
market is allowed to die.
A.

Does Small Group Coverage Provide Other Consumer Benefits?

1.

Are People More Likely to Acquire Health Coverage if It Is Offered
Through a Group Market?

Purchasing health insurance in the individual market can be an
onerous undertaking fraught with information frictions, time costs, and
procedural hurdles. Consumers must estimate their health care needs in
advance, search for coverage (through an online exchange, from an
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insurer directly, or through broker258), and select a single product that
best meets their needs from an array of options. At the end of each year,
consumers must reevaluate their coverage needs and either renew their
plan or select new coverage. The purchasing process is also subject to
strict time pressures—there is typically a short time frame to purchase
coverage.259 Once insured, consumers must ensure timely premium
payments; otherwise coverage will be lost.260
This cumbersome process is complicated by the limited capacity of
consumers to effectively shop for insurance. Many consumers have an
incomplete understanding of key insurance concepts261 and suffer from
limited health literacy and numeracy.262 Behavioral economics research
suggests that consumers are rationally bounded—they have a limited
ability to absorb and process the information relevant to complex
decision making.263 The result can be flawed choices due to the use of
mental shortcuts264 and procrastination.265
258. Katherine Hempstead, The Off-Exchange Individual Market and Small Group Market: New
HIX
Compare
Data,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161024.057190/full/
[https://perma.cc/2RU3AUNB] (noting that ACA-compliant individual plans are available on an exchange, directly from an
insurer, or through a broker and that over 25% of ACA-compliant individual market products sold
in 2016 were sold off the exchange).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b) (2012) (allowing enrollment to be restricted to limited periods).
Open enrollment—when anyone could sign up for coverage—runs from November 1 to December
15. 45 C.F.R. § 155.410(e)(3) (2017).
260. See Robert Pear, One-Fifth of New Enrollees Under Health Care Law Fail to Pay First
Premium, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/us/politics/one-in-5buyers-of-insurance-under-new-law-did-not-pay-premiums-on-time.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2018) (reporting that 20% of new enrollees in the individual market in 2014 pay failed to pay their
premiums on-time and therefore did not receive coverage). The ACA provides a three-month grace
period for exchange enrollees who fail to pay premiums timely. 42 U.S.C. § 18082(c)(2)(B)(iv)(II);
45 C.F.R. § 156.270(g). If, however, coverage is lost through non-payment of premiums beyond the
grace period, the individual may not simply re-enroll. Instead, she must wait for the next open
enrollment period to resume exchange coverage. Catherine E. Livingston et al., Third-Party
Payment of Premiums for Private Health Insurance Offered on the Exchanges, 8 J. HEALTH & LIFE
SCI. L. 1, 9–10 (2015).
261. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32
J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 858 (2013) (reporting that only 14% of survey respondents could answer
four simple multiple-choice questions about insurance cost-sharing features and that most
respondents were unable to accurately estimate the cost of their medical services).
262. Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic: The Role of Health Literacy in Health
Care Access, Quality, & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 253, 260 (2011) (noting results from a survey
conducted in 2003 that found only 12% of the 19,000 adults surveyed were proficient in health
literacy); Christopher R. Trudeau, Plain Language in Healthcare: What Lawyers Need to Know
About Health Literacy, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2016, at 36, 37 (noting that about 88% of Americans have
problems understanding health information).
263. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1143 (2000) (“To save
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Group coverage, on the other hand, provides a more streamlined
process for obtaining and maintaining health insurance, thereby reducing
the potential hitches and hassles that could prevent or interrupt
individual market coverage. Plan choice is simplified; the employer
offers only a limited number of plans. Enrollment occurs at the
beginning of employment, payment for coverage is made by the
employer, and the employee’s contribution is deducted from payroll.
Enrollment continues so long as the employee remains employed and
does not cancel coverage. The simplicity and tidiness of this process
suggests that group coverage may be more effective at achieving
enrollment than the individual market.266
Intuitively this seems correct; people may be more likely, assuming
comparable coverage and prices in both markets, to acquire and maintain
coverage in the group market than the individual market. Yet there is no
evidence to support this claim. Moreover, there is some evidence that
employment-based group plans do not always translate into coverage—
even in cases where the employer covers the premium (that is, the
worker pays no additional premium above wages), and the employee has
no other access to coverage.267 In a study by Chernew et al., which
examined the effect of premium reductions on participation in employersponsored health plans by low-income workers employed by small
firms, the authors estimated that even when the employer paid 100% of
the premium, approximately 10% of low-income individuals remained

time, avoid complexity, and generally make dealing with the challenges of daily life tractable, actors
ofteu [sic] adopt decision strategies or employ heuristics that lead to decisions that fail to maximize
their utility.”).
264. Id. See also Brendan S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: Choices,
Defaults, and the Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1106 (2012) (“Insurance purchasing is
widely believed to be an area in which humans are extremely susceptible to cognitive biases and
flawed decision-making.”).
265. See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON.
121, 124 (2001) (finding that additional options and important decisions can induce
procrastination).
266. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Unlocking Exchanges, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 125, 137–38 (2017)
(“Tying health insurance to the labor deal increases the likelihood that it will be purchased . . . .”).
267. See Michael Chernew et al., The Demand for Health Insurance Coverage by Low-Income
Workers: Can Reduced Premiums Achieve Full Coverage?, 32 HEALTH SERV. RES. 453, 464–66
(1997) (estimating that about 10% of low-income workers remain uninsured, even if the employer
charges no premium and the worker has no other source of coverage); Philip F. Cooper & Jessica
Vistnes, Workers’ Decisions to Take-up Offered Health Insurance Coverage: Assessing the
Importance of Out-of-Pocket Premium Costs, 41 MED. CARE III-35, III-42 (2003) (finding results
similar to Chernew et al., but, due to data limitations, unable to exclude workers with outside
sources of insurance).
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uninsured.268 The authors offered several possible explanations for this
finding. One possibility was that these individuals preferred to remain
uninsured. While this preference could be irrational, for example due to
the belief by some of these individuals that they will never need medical
care, Chernew et al. also noted that the decision to remain uninsured
could also be rational.269 For instance, some health insurance includes
expensive cost-sharing that would not be waived by health care
providers, and uninsured low-income individuals might be better off
forgoing insurance in favor of low- or no-cost public care for both
emergent and non-emergent medical needs.270 Another possibility was
that these individuals could have been deterred by the administrative
costs of enrolling or that they lacked sufficient information about the
benefits of the insurance and simply skipped coverage.271 In short, there
may be personal and financial factors that could deter an individual’s
decision to take up coverage, even in the context of group insurance
without premium. The study also suggests that group coverage may still
present information and administrative barriers that impede coverage by
some individuals.
2.

Are Employers Better than Employees at Selecting Health
Insurance?

A second potential consumer benefit is that employers can act as
sophisticated and beneficial purchasing agents by selecting health
insurance that more closely meets the needs of their employees. Unlike
individual market consumers, employers (or their brokers or agents)
have more resources to devote to the purchase of health insurance,272
and, unlike consumers, are not disadvantaged by bounded rationality.273
Moreover, employers have, at least in theory, an incentive to provide
optimal coverage. Because employers vie for employees in a competitive
labor market, and because employees are thought to value health
268. Chernew et al., supra note 267, at 466.
269. Id. at 467.
270. Id.
271. Id. Indeed, the authors observe that many low-income individuals also forego public
benefits, such as food stamps, despite their eligibility, due to barriers such as information deficits or
perceived administrative burdens. Id. Also, the authors raise the possibility that the 10% uninsured
figure could be a statistical artifact. However, they discount this possibility by noting that estimates
for coverage of other subsets of individuals in the study were highly accurate. Id. at 466–67.
272. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 11, at 30.
273. See id. (noting that employers provide “informational intermediation” for their employees,
compensating for their bounded rationality).
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insurance coverage, employers face pressure to offer attractive plans;
otherwise they risk losing employees to firms that offer more favorable
coverage.274 Perhaps this explains why survey data suggests that most
employees are satisfied with their employer’s choice of plans.275
But there is no evidence to support the notion that employers are
superior purchasers of insurance. Moreover, the employer-employee
relationship is fundamentally adversarial with respect to compensation
and benefits.276 While the employee benefits from coverage, the
employer picks the terms and cost of the insurance benefit. And survey
data suggests that employers are more likely to choose a health
insurance plan based on their own financial interests rather than on the
preferences of their employees.277
B.

Does Small Group Coverage Benefit Employers?

Do small firm employers benefit from offering health coverage? The
answer appears to be “largely, no” with a possible exception for small
employers employing high-income workers.
Group coverage is thought to provide two benefits to employers. First,
“[e]mployers might benefit from providing health insurance . . . if it
allow[s] them to recruit and retain high-quality workers.”278 The
assumption underlying this belief is that group coverage provides a
better deal than individual coverage—it is less expensive, subsidized by
taxes, and accessible without individual underwriting. If true, offering
group coverage could help employers attract and retain quality
274. See Jonathan T. Kolstad & Michael E. Chernew, Quality and Consumer Decision Making in
the Market for Health Insurance and Health Care Services, 66 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 28S, 31S
(2009); Pamela B. Peele et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Are Employers Good Agents
for Their Employees?, 78 MILBANK Q. 5, 7 (2000) (“Economists would argue that employers are
likely to act effectively as agents because, if they do not, they will ultimately bear the cost of that
ineffectiveness in higher total compensation costs and/or greater employee turnover.”).
275. See Peele et al., supra note 274, at 19 (finding that large employers “perform reasonably
well as agents for their individual employees in the health insurance market”).
276. See Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1257,
1261 (2016).
277. See Employer Perspectives on the Health Insurance Market: A Survey of Businesses in the
United States: Research Highlights, ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH,
http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/employer-perspectives-on-the-healthinsurance-market-a-survey-of-businesses-in-the-united-states-research-highlights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4G45-W5JS] (reporting survey finding that 86% of employers that offer health
insurance say the cost to the organization is very or extremely important, while less than 40% said
employee preference was important).
278. See Ellen O’Brien, Employers’ Benefits from Workers’ Health Insurance, 81 MILBANK Q. 5,
6 (2003).
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employees. But to the extent that small group coverage does not provide
a better deal than individual coverage to low- and moderate-income
workers, there is little reason to think that offering group coverage will
help small firms recruit and retain high-quality workers from those
groups. Low- and moderate-income workers get a better tax subsidy if
they buy individual insurance from an exchange and risk losing the
better subsidy if they are offered “affordable” small group coverage.279
On the other hand, small employers who want to attract and retain higher
income workers—those with household incomes over 400% FPL and
who get no tax subsidy in the individual market—could benefit from
offering group health insurance.
Second, there is thought to be a “business case” for offering group
coverage. Offering coverage can improve the employer’s bottom line by
reducing some employee-related costs. Based on a review of relevant
scholarship, however, economist Thomas Buchmueller concluded that
offering employer-based health insurance has limited potential to offer
four “spillover benefits” to small employers: (1) reduced turnover,
(2) lowered workers’ compensation costs, (3) reduced absenteeism, and
(4) increased productivity.280 As Buchmueller noted:
The most promising source of spillover benefits comes from the
fact that health insurance is negatively associated with employee
turnover. However, the benefit of reducing turnover . . . is likely
to be smallest for the types of firms that are least likely to offer
insurance—small firms employing less-skilled workers. The
scholarly literature provides even less support for the notion that
offering health insurance will reduce employers’ costs
associated with workers’ compensation or employee
absenteeism. Similarly, the literature gives no reason for
employers to expect that offering insurance will cause worker
productivity to increase dramatically. Thus, it appears that for
the small firms that choose not to offer health benefits, the
decision is one that makes sound business sense.281

279. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
280. THOMAS C. BUCHMUELLER, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH
BENEFITS:
A
REVIEW
OF
THE
RELEVANT
LITERATURE
18
(2000),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ab68/d2bf7205938d1b6fc2ffa16c75e472302e5b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34BG-4JPB].
281. Id. But see O’Brien, supra note 278, at 34–35 (arguing that more study is needed).
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Proposed Improvements to the Small Market: Will They Deliver
Group Benefits?

Scholars and policymakers have offered various suggestions to
improve the small group market, including regulating or prohibiting
stop-loss insurance to reduce small firm self-insurance; promoting the
use of an online exchange, such as the Small Business Health Options
Program (SHOP) exchange; and merging the small and individual
markets.282 If any of these fixes are implemented, will the small group
market deliver group benefits? Will these policy changes help the small
group market offer a better deal than the individual market? Probably
not. No doubt, these suggested changes, if implemented, could very well
improve how the small group market performs. But they are unlikely to
transform small group insurance into a better deal for insureds than
individual coverage.
1.

Restricting Stop-Loss Insurance

Self-insurance was appealing for small firms before the ACA. Selfinsured plans were not subject to state insurance laws, including
mandated benefits requirements, premium taxes, and consumer
protection requirements.283 The ACA has made self-insurance even more
desirable for some firms, especially those with younger and healthier
employees, because it can provide lower premiums than a communityrated small group market pool.284 It also exempts small firms from the
ACA’s small group market reforms.285
To slow the spread of self-insurance by small firms, many have
recommended limits on stop-loss insurance.286 Stop-loss coverage covers
the employer’s losses above a certain threshold287 and protects small

282. For a wide-ranging discussion of policy options to “save” the small group market, see
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1975–87.
283. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2037.
284. Id.
285. See Jost & Hall, supra note 9, at 550–52.
286. See, e.g., Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2039 (“To prevent this potential erosion of
insurance, states need to reform their stop-loss markets so that stop-loss coverage is not de facto
health insurance.”); Jost & Hall, supra note 9, at 556 (arguing that the federal and state governments
should regulate stop-loss coverage to protect the small group market); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra
note 9, at 1975–77.
287. This is the attachment point, which is the dollar amount where stop-loss insurance begins to
pay claims. See Jost & Hall, supra note 9, at 546.
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employers from large claims that could bankrupt the firm.288 By making
stop-loss coverage less attractive or available to small firms, the number
of small firms choosing to self-insure could decrease,289 possibly
reducing adverse selection against the small group market. But
regulation of stop-loss will not solve the small group market’s adverse
selection problem. If a small firm is denied the ability to buy stop-loss
insurance (or denied the amount of stop-loss insurance it wants), it can
still select against the small group market by self-insuring anyway (at
greater risk) or by opting out of coverage completely. Moreover,
restricting stop-loss coverage will not transform small group coverage
into a better deal than individual coverage by lowering administrative
costs, increasing access, or altering existing tax subsidies.
2.

Promoting SHOP Exchanges

SHOP exchanges are online marketplaces through which small
employers can provide coverage to their employees. SHOP exchanges
were designed to provide, among other things, administrative services to
small firms.290 Most small firms use brokers and those brokers provide
many administrative services to small firms,291 driving up the cost of
coverage. Since the SHOP exchanges were expected to perform many of
the same administrative functions at a lower cost, they were anticipated
to be a less expensive alternative to brokers.292 This is one of the reasons
advocates have argued for increased use of SHOP exchanges. In
addition, some small firms using SHOP exchanges are also eligible for a
temporary tax credit.293 But there are two impediments to reaping the
benefits of the SHOP exchanges.

288. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1966 (“In the absence of [stop-loss] coverage, a
single employee or employee family member becoming very sick could jeopardize a small
employer’s business.”).
289. Id. at 1975 (“[M]aking stop-loss insurance less available to small employers . . . could
decrease the attractiveness of self-insurance for these employers.”). Of course, some small firms
might continue to self-insure without stop-loss, ultimately relying on the bankruptcy process should
they be unable to pay employee claims.
290. See Gabel et al., supra note 211, at 2033.
291. See id. at 2038.
292. See id. (“The SHOP exchanges will perform many of the same functions [as brokers], and
with superior technology and economies of scale they will be able to do so at a lower cost than
brokers can offer.”).
293. See id. at 2033, 2036.
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First, the SHOP exchanges have not worked out as planned.
Enrollment has been disappointing294 and few small firms have taken
advantage of the tax break, for multiple reasons, including its short twoyear duration, the significant costs and complexities required to claim
the tax credit, and the small size of the credit.295 As a result, the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services has ended the federal SHOP
exchanges,296 which operated in thirty-three states.297 SHOP exchanges,
however, are not dead. More than a dozen states still operate SHOP
exchanges. But there is a catch when trying to get small firms to the
SHOP exchanges. This is the second problem. Brokers remain a major
source of information and guidance for small firms. To be successful,
SHOP exchanges have to rely on brokers to drive them business. But
brokers will not do so if they lose commissions by sending small
employers to the SHOP.298 This creates a Catch-22 of sorts:
administrative costs can be lowered in the SHOP exchanges, but small
firms are unlikely to go to SHOP exchanges unless brokers earning high
commissions bring small employers to the SHOP exchanges.
3.

Merging the Small and Individual Markets

The ACA gives states the ability to merge their individual and small
group health insurance markets.299 But this option would not combine all
aspects of these markets. Instead, there would only be a merger of the
small group and individual market risk pools.300 This would create a
294. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-58, SMALL BUSINESS HEALTH INSURANCE
EXCHANGES: LOW ENROLLMENT LIKELY DUE TO MULTIPLE, EVOLVING FACTORS 20–22 (2014),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666873.pdf [https://perma.cc/25GR-HPMR].
295. See JAMES R. MCTIGUE, JR., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-491T, SMALL
EMPLOYER HEALTH TAX CREDIT: LIMITED USE CONTINUES DUE TO MULTIPLE REASONS 5–10
(2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675969.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5RT-5D45].
296. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE FUTURE OF THE SHOP: CMS INTENDS TO
ALLOW SMALL BUSINESSES IN SHOPS USING HEALTHCARE.GOV MORE FLEXIBILITY WHEN
ENROLLING
IN
HEALTHCARE
COVERAGE
(2017),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/The-Future-of-theSHOP-CMS-Intends-to-Allow-Small-Businesses-in-SHOPs-Using-HealthCaregov-MoreFlexibility-when-Enrolling-in-Healthcare-Coverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFP5-LVYA].
297. See Timothy Jost, CMS Announces Plans to Effectively End the SHOP Exchange, HEALTH
AFF. BLOG (May 15, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170515.060112/full/
[https://perma.cc/4EJP-FAR3].
298. Jon R. Gabel et al., An Early Look at SHOP Marketplaces: Low Premiums, Adequate Plan
Choice in Many, but Not All, States, 34 HEALTH AFF. 732, 739 (2015).
299. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c)(3) (2012).
300. JILL S. HERBOLD, MILLIMAN, MERGING THE INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP MARKETS 1
(2011), https://www.in.gov/healthcarereform/files/Merge_Ind_SG.pdf [https://perma.cc/89NC-
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larger and more stable risk pool for the purpose of projecting future
rates, but a larger risk pool will not stop small group adverse selection,
reduce small group high administrative costs, increase access, or alter
existing tax subsidies. In short, a merged risk pool would do nothing to
improve the small group market’s ability to provide a better insurance
deal than the individual market.
D.

Who Wins and Who Loses if the Small Group Market Dies?

The demise of the small group market would yield two big winners:
the individual market and insurers who sell in that market. First, the
individual market is the most logical landing spot for the 14.7 million
people with small group coverage. While it is unlikely that all
14.7 million customers would shift to the small group market, the
millions that would move to the individual market would make the that
market larger, more stable, and less susceptible to rate fluctuations.
Second, insurers in the individual market could benefit from the
potential for greater profits from a larger customer base and more
stability in the market.
The biggest losers would be the insurance companies (and their
brokers and agents) that sell small group coverage, and households
insured through the small group market with incomes above 400% FPL.
Despite the market’s declining enrollment, insurers in the small group
remain profitable.301 If the small group market were allowed to decline
and die, those insurers (and their brokers and agents) would lose a
profitable line of business. Additionally, households insured through the
small group market with incomes above 400% FPL would be losers if
those households had no other access to group coverage. If forced into
the individual market, those households would lose their group tax
subsidy and be ineligible for exchange subsidies. They would pay much
more for their insurance. Yet if Congress wanted to maintain a tax
benefit for these households, it could do so by allowing small employers
to reimburse their employees for individually purchased health insurance
8RE8] (observing that the ACA’s merger provision “means that individual premium amounts and
small group premium amounts are based on the combined health cost experience of the small group
and individual risk pools. This does not automatically require health benefit plans and premium
amounts in the individual and small group markets to be the same.”).
301. See Tammy Tomczyk & Peter Kaczmarek, New Analysis: Enrollment and Profitability
Trends in the Individual and Small-Group Markets, OLIVER WYMAN HEALTH (Sept. 8, 2016),
http://health.oliverwyman.com/maximize-value/2016/09/new_analysis_enroll.html
[https://perma.cc/8NLL-E2W2] (reporting that small group insurers continue to be profitable,
though profits have been declining).
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with pre-tax dollars, as they had been allowed to do prior to the ACA.302
Indeed, federal law does permit some small employers without group
health coverage to reimburse employees for individual health insurance
premiums, but only under limited circumstances.303
CONCLUSION
Group insurance has long been the dominant vehicle for delivering
health insurance in this country. The reason for that dominance was
simple: group health coverage offered insurance buyers a better deal
than the individual market. Prior to the ACA, this better deal was true
for small group coverage, despite the adverse selection problems and
volatility of the small group market. The ACA, however, altered this
calculation by changing the nature of the individual market. As a result,
the small group market no longer offers a better deal than the individual
market with respect to three of the four core benefits of the group model:
reduced adverse selection, lower administrative costs, and increased
access to coverage. With respect to the fourth benefit, tax subsidies,
there is a split. Although the small group market continues to deliver the
tax benefits it did before, low- and moderate-income households will get
a better tax subsidy in the individual market. Households above 400%
FPL, which are excluded from subsidies in the individual market, will do
better in the small group market.
Of course, additional dismantling of the ACA will alter this analysis.
But if the ACA remains in place, one thing seems clear: absent further
intervention, the small group market will continue to decline. The
findings in this Article suggest that scholars, legislators, and
policymakers should respond carefully to the problems of the current
302. Beginning in 1961, employees were allowed to purchase their own insurance and then seek
reimbursement in pre-tax dollars from their employer. Rev. Ruling 61-146, 1961-2 C.B. 25. This
came to an end under the ACA. I.R.S. Notice 2015-17 (April 6, 2015) (noting in Guidance Answer
1 that arrangements under which an employer reimburses an employee for premium expenses
incurred for an individual market health insurance policy fail to comply with the ACA market
reforms and may subject the employer to an excise tax under I.R.C. § 4980D (2012)); I.R.S. Notice
2013-54 (Sept. 13, 2013) (stating in Guidance Answer 1 that employer payment plans that
reimburse employees for individual market health insurance premiums fail to meet required ACA
market reforms for group health plans).
303. Small employers can provide tax-favored reimbursements to employees for the purchase of
individual health insurance by setting up a “qualified small employer health reimbursement
arrangement” (QSEHRA) that meets specific criteria. The employer must not offer group health
coverage to any of its employees, the QSEHRA must be offered to all full-time employees, no
salary reductions are permitted, and annual employer contributions are capped at $4,950 for a single
individual or $10,000 for a family, subject to indexing. I.R.C. § 9831(d) (West 2012 & West Supp.
IV 2016); I.R.S. Notice 2017-67 (Oct. 31, 2017).
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small group market and ask: What benefits does the small group market
offer and what would the health insurance landscape would look like if
no further efforts to prop up the small group market were taken?

